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Customs union is defined as the undisturbed freedom of movement within the EC for 
goods, services, money, and economic agents. In this study, being highlighted by a 
comparative analysis, the union to be realized with the European Community and its 
probable impacts on the Turkish economy have been evaluated. The macroeconomic and 
sectoral environments have been examined in order to set base to the required adjustment 
processes, and antieipate and direct the future moves.
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ÖZET
GÜMRÜK BİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİYE: 
İSPANYA VE PORTEKİZ UYUM PROSESLERİNİN 
VE TÜRKİYE İÇİN OLAN DURUMUN 
ICARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ
Danışman: Doç.Dr. Gökhan Çapoğlu
Gümrük Birliği, Avrupa Topluluğu içerisinde, malların, hizmetlerin, para ve economik 
araçların engelsiz dolaşım özgürlüğü olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada. Topluluk 
ile Türkiye arasında gerçekleştirilmesi planlanan gümrük birliği ve bu birliğin Türkiye 
ekonomisi üzerinde olası etkileri, karşılaştırmalı analizler ışığında değerlendirilmiştir. 
Gerekli uyum proseslerinin ve ilerleyen aşamalarda yapılacakların belirlenebilmesi 
amacıyla, çalışma mala'oekonomik ve sektörel bazda gerçekleştirilmiştir.
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Turkey has a foot in the door of a customs union to be realized with the European 
Community, although it has not acquired full membership, yet. Under the pre-determined 
schedules and procedures, stated in the Additional Protocol of 1973, the country has 
committed itself to complete the union requirements within 22 years, that's by 1995.
The unstability of the macroeconomic environment brought out the need to, fiirther, 
question the issue and its probable impacts, either sectoral or holistic. The long-lasting 
discussions on the challenges to be encountered have not, however, led to clear and well- 
defined processes to overcome them.
In this study, a comparative analysis has been provided in order to evaluate the current 
situation and set basis for wliat-to-do's. Being the last ones to integrate into thé 
Community, having similar economic environments to Turkey, and having almost 
completed their internal adjustment processes for the customs union, Spain and Portugal 
have been selected for the comparison.
Since these countries have been integrated into the European Community (EC) by the 
second enlargement decision, and the accession arrangements have relied on many 
counterfeiting arguments posed by other member states of the Community, in the first 
section of the thesis, this enlargement process has been studied and its impacts on the 
unity have been evaluated.
In order to provide a theoretical basis for the study, the customs union issue, being 
defined as the 'undisturbed freedom of movement within the EC for goods, services, 
money, and economic agents', has been further examined.
As for the adjustment processes, in the third and fourth sections of the report, both Spain 
and Portugal have been assessed based on their macro and microeconomic structural 
formations. The reforms and liberalization acts have been analyzed to evaluate the union 
effects on the economies of the two countries.
I.INTRODUCTION
Eventually, the required analysis for Turkey has been realized. Depending on the 
historical links betwee^ the country and the EC and the former relations (both economic
and political), the impacts of the customs union on the Turkish economy have been 
studied. In the light of the compared indicators, the macroeeonomic and sectoral 
assessments have been provided in order to lead to a conclusion on Turkey's anticipated 
future under the union practices.
II. SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF EC
The initial economic integration act of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, was later on extended to both political and other social 
arenas due to the new world order and global trends by the first and second enlargements. 
The Community happened to be of Nine with United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 
1973, and of Ten with Greece by the start of 1981.
EC deeided to overtake this expansion process, because the reasons to do so were already 
stated in the Treaty of Rome. The member states were committed to pool their resources 
'to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty' and to summon 'other peoples of Europe 
who share their ideal to join in their efforts', by the preamble.'
Portugal acquired the most important qualification for membership by adopting 
democracy following decades of dictatorship in 1974, and Spain followed it in 1975. The 
eeonomy of Spain had remained baekward and underdeveloped after many years of high 
protection. As for that of Portugal, it had been subordinated to the requirements of a 
colonial empire. The membership, from those aspects, seemed to bring significant 
benefits to both of the countries. The links to be developed with the EC would allow for 
successful transition to democracy as well as economic development.
The economies of the two countries were already seen to be integrating themselves 
closely with the EC by 1977, when the key decisions to join the Community were taken 
in Lisbon and Madrid. This process has continued so that, by 1983, Spain sent 48% of all 
its exports to EC countries and took 32% of its imports from them, while comparable 
figures for Portugal were 59% and 39% respectively. As for an older member, the UK 
had sent 32% of its exports to the Community on its aecession in 1973.2
'l ie  News, .lanuary 1986.
^Direction of Trade Statislies Yearbook, 1985.
The negotiations had been attained after long-lasting discussions within the EC. The 
Community did not only argue on the acceptance procedures, but also on the timetables 
to be followed, and a huge number of special deals. The deals were including the 
integration into the CAP, the dismantling of tariffs governing trade between the new 
members and the EC, together with the erection by the new member states of the common 
external tariffs and its contributions to and benefits from the Community budget. 
Eventually the basic treaties of accession were signed on 12 June 1985. Spelling out the 
process of incorporation, the documents had covered 36 annexes, 25 protocols on issues 
ranging from Spanish motor car tariffs to restructuring the Portuguese steel industry, and 
47 declarations and joint declarations by the existing member states.^
There were at least three key problems to be dealt with before accession could become a 
reality. Problems were entitled as:
1. the need to cut the excesses of CAP whose share of total Community budget 
expenditure was above 70 per cent in 1980: Spanish membership would add to costly 
surpluses of wine and olive oil and its highly competitive fruit and vegetable 
production would spark demands for protective expenditure from growers in Italy, 
France and Greece.
2. the budgetary crisis for which the CAP was largely responsible: The Community's 
budget revenues are derived from customs duties and agricultural levies on third 
counti-y imports collected by member states at their borders,'and from VAT payments. 
In a fully harmonized community in which similar VAT rates are levied on identical 
goods, the Community budget would have been able to claim up to 1 per cent of each 
member state's Vat revenues. In the absence of such harmonization it drew up to 1 per 
cent of retail sales of a common basket of goods and seiwices, and this margin did not 
seem to finance the planned enlargement."' It was possible to raise the 1 per cent 
ceiling, but this was linked with a third problem.
3. the demand of UK to reduce its net contributions to the EC budget: The British 
Government would not allow the EC to raise extra money without a budget deal for 
Britain.
The Ten came together in France, in June 1984 and settled the British budget problem 
and agreed to raise the 1 per cent VAT ceiling to 1.4 per cent. However the internal
'Donges, J, ct al., The Second Enlargement of the I 'liiropean Community, Kieler Studien, 1982.
+lbid.
conflicts on reforming the Community's wine production regime and Greece's demands 
for huge expenditures in future years to offset the impact of enlargement on 
Mediterranean regions didn't allow the negotiations with Portugal and Spain be concluded 
by the end of the year. On 29 March 1985, the last obstacles were overeóme and the 
following day the European Council noted that the fundamental issues of the negotiations 
with Spain and Portugal had been resolved.
Although the initially targeted date was 1 January 1983, due to the problems stated 
above, on 1 January 1986, the EC become 12 with the accession of these two countries. 
As a result of this second enlargement, it has reached to a population of 321 million 
which was almost two times of the number when the Community was first established in 
1958. On the path of being a union, the EC, then, embraced to Twelve member states and 
was brought into a much younger population than the EC average by the entry of Spain 
and Portugal.
The adoption of Single European Act by the Couneil in December 1985 and the aceession 
of Spain and Portugal at the beginning of 1986 stimulated a new perception of the process 
of integration- from "europessimism to europhoria" (Dale Smith, 1993).
The changes faced by the Community were not seemingly threatening and great. Its 
population expanded from 270 to 320 million, its gross domestic product (GDP) from 
£1,666 billion to £1,806 billion and its land mass from 640,000 to 870,000 square miles. 
The concerning part of this integration was, however, due to the political reasons. The 
enlargement was considered to shift the center of gravity and power away from the old 
and developed northern member states to the poorer Mediterranean south. With Spain's 
per capita GDP just over half the Community average and -Portugal's less than a third, 
arguments over the role, size and the allocations of the EC budget were sharpened and a 
re-settlement was needed. The Community's capacity for coherent and cohesive action 
was tested.
The Treaty of Aceession for Spain and Portugal was signed in June 1985, but it had 
allowed a ten years transition period to the above two eountries for adopting themselves 
to fully apply to the EC rules. On the other hand, the impact of the membership was felt 
long before. Industry and agriculture in both countries were exposed to much stronger 
competition, and their economies reflected the strain of EC membership before they 
tasted its benefits. As for the EC, problems of controlling and reforming the Common
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) were magnified along with the size and costs of some of its 
product surpluses.
II. 1. RESULTS OF ENLARGEMENT
It was estimated that EC spending would increase by 20 per cent, whereas revenues 
would increase by 12 per cent. It turns out that, this actually entailed only the fairly 
moderate outlay of ECU 1.4 billion per year. The ironic factor tempering the cost was 
that both couritries imported a sizable proportion of foodstuffs and would thus be called 
on to contribute a significant amount of variable levies into the Community fund.
A positive aspect of EC enlargement was a stronger political unity with higher voice in 
economic and political issues. Entry, also, served to modernize the new members, Iberia, 
traditionally being a backwater area of Europe. On the other hand, an EC of twelve rather 
than ten could be considered a weaker cohesive unit than before. Decision making 
difficulties might arise on political issues, and they might be less able to establish policies 
that would eventually lead to a united Europe.
III. CUSTOMS UNION
Having a tlieoiy of its own, customs union procedures and process deal with gains from 
specialization of production, economies of scale, greater competition, externalities 
associated with agglomeration, improvement in terms of trade, an increased rate of 
growth, and political unification.^
Among the static and dynamic effects of the customs union, the most sound ones are 
entitled by Overturf as follows:
1. the economies of scale, or increasing returns from large size, with specialization and 
product variety,
2. the competition which can result from opening up the formerly protected national 




3. the possibility of faster innovation and an investment boom to follow the introduction 
of these new opportunities.
Economies of Scale: Greater market size allows for greater firm size and for greater 
economies of scale in research and development or technological knowledge formation. 
Customs union leads to an increase in intra-industry specialization and trade, which 
results with lowering of costs. European firms, before the union, produced many products 
for the home market, all within a narrow definition of their industry. Union made it 
possible to produce some of the products to serve a much wider market and take 
advahtage of longer runs, with lower inventory costs, lef:s downtime for switching 
between product runs and greater labor specialization. Consumers will also experience a 
rise in their welfare when these lower costs are passed on to the prices.
Specialization of Production: If a countiy prices the good in question higher than the 
world price, this autarky (no trade) price indicates that it does not have a comparative 
advantage, and does not efficiently utilize the factors of production related to that good. 
Free trade, as a result of the customs union, will lead to competition and ensure the world 
price be domestic as well. This, in turn, helps for greater welfare through increased 
consumption, a shifting of resources to probably more efficient use through specialization 
of production and an improvement in the welfare through free international trade.
External Economies Associated with Agglomeration: This is another possible gain from 
customs union. The producers are better able to consider optimal firm location, input 
prices and proximity to the resources. Low costs for specific types of financial, legal, or 
consulting services are some examples to such externalities. On the other hand, 
production centers may tend to develop by leaving regional backwaters of low growth 
and high unemployment if all factors are not sufficiently mobile.
Increased Rate of Growth: Another potential gain from the establishment of a customs 
union is an increase in the rate of growth. This will probably be achieved as a result of 
competition forcing technological advance, and greater investment in union wide 
markets.
Improvement in Terms of Trade: The terms of trade can be defined as the price of 
exports divided by the price of imports, and this is considered to give out the trade 
welfare in the amount of imports available to a society per unit of exports. The union
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causes improvement in terms of trade. A reduction in import prices, therefore, raises 
societal welfare.
Development of Political Union; Customs union, initially in the form of an economic 
integration, is antieipated to proceed in the path of developing a political union.
Increased Competition: By lowering the tariff barriers the efficiency of competition is 
forced.^ Freer trade tends to force efficiency by forcing competition with other union 
industries. Union can be thought to give way to intra-union cartelization to replace the old 
oligopoly structure, but, for Europe, this is extremely difficult to achieve due to the 
Community antitrust attitude.
I'lie gains from trade are reduced if an import tax is imposed on the good. Tariff 
imposition on world price (of the formerly freely traded good) increases domestic 
production, but, on the other hand, imports drop, total consumption decreases due to the 
high price and the country experiences a net loss on welfare in two ways. First, there is a 
loss in consumer welfare since eonsumers have to pay a higher price for the good and 
therefore cut back their quantity demanded. Second, there is a Iqss due to the fact that not 
all of the increased payment is actually received by the government and the produeers.
In fact, it may have been these very domestic producers who put pressure on the 
government to initially impose the tariff. Under such circumstances, an increase in 
domestic production is called a loss in efficiency and production for the economy as a 
whole. A union creates freer trade and leads to a reduction of the above losses (Overturf, 
1986).
Customs union also shows its effects in the forms of trade creation and trade diversion.
1. Trade Creation: As already explained, it is possible to encounter a reduction in the net 
welfare due to the losses incurred through tariff imposition. The trade creation effect 
is of the obverse situation and relates to a gain in welfare.
2. Trade Diversion: This effect relates to the diversion of trade from most efficient 
producer to the most efficient union producer and a shift ip production.
’^.Some problems can be expected to appear as in the form of oligopoly practices in which domestic 
producers, usually through barriers to entry, are able to constrain output, divide the market, artificially raise 
prices, and reap monopoly profit. This causes the eonsumer to suffer by paying too high a price for a 
possibly lower quality item, that is inefficiently produced.
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Therefore, the benefits of a union depends on the balanee between the two effeets. It is 
theoretieally possible that freer trade may not be optimal in the sense of increasing either 
the country's welfare or the overall productive efficiency of the world. As an example, 
pure trade diversion results from perfectly inelastic supply and demand curves, and is a 
pure loss from union fonnation. The higher the original tariffs on potential partners, the 
greater the probability of significant gain upon the elimination of those duties.
EC members benefit from increased intra-union trade -due to specialization, by 
eliminating tariffs among themselves. It is estimated by the Eurostat that actual intra-EC 
trade has expanded at a much faster rate than the EC trade with the rest of the world. 
Direct estimates of trade creation and diversion, in Community case, show that the former 
has significantly outweighed the latter.
Although it can be concluded that such a union establishment and expansion leads to 
increased welfare in one or another way, some non-economic objectives of nations, 
including sovereignty maintenance, precedes over economic rationality and concentrated 
vested interests (industries losing protection) speak louder than desegregated consumers 
(Overturf, 1986).
Being defined as 'the undisturbed freedom of movement within the EC for goods, 
services, money and economic agents', information about the economic effects of the 
customs union was not timely provided by the economists. Viner·^ , focusing the concept 
on the issue of trade diversion versus trade creation in static terms, opened up a debate on 
the wrong foot. This allowed the English economists to permit their preference for 
general free trade over a customs union, and Cooper and MasselE expressed the 
inclinations of many of them in highlighting the conclusion that, on the special 
assumptions that underlay the customs union theory (including perfect competition and 
tillT employment of all sources), there was always a 'non-discriminatory' policy that 
would be better than a customs union. After another fifteen years, the Wonnacotts pointed
^.lacob Vincr, The Customs Union Issue, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950.
^C.A.Cooper and B.F.Massell, 'A New Look at Customs Union Theory', Economic Journal, December
1965.
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out that this conclusion rested on the assumption that the rest of the world didn't use 
tariffs.9
Almost all of the econometricians, working on the trade effects of the EC's customs 
union, concluded that 'trade creation has exceeded trade diversion by a considei'able 
margin, typically between five and ten fold'd^ The early customs union theorists were not 
incorrect, since they had let the elfects depend on such matters as the height of the 
common external tariff and the size of the union. A reduction on the EC tariff through 
GATT negotiations might lead to a reduction in the scope of trade diversion.
The value of trade created by the second half of the 1960s was estimated to be between 
$5-1 1 billion for manufacturers, compared with $0-3.7 billion for trade diversion. On the 
other hand, the estimated gain to production and consumption, and hence welfare, was 
much less, because the newly traded goods were considered to have replaced. The most 
cited estimates are for a gain of 0.15 per cent to Community GNP, and 0.22 per cent (0.16 
per cent trade creation and 0.06 per cent trade diversion) for the UK after entry into the 
EC. Estimates of the effect of the European Free Trade Association on its members 
ranged from 0.0041 per cent for the UK up to 0.036 for Denmark."
Since the above studies did not end up with serious quantitative results, the attention was 
given to other related areas. In 1972, Corden observed that with the increasing returns 
that may be expected when there are economies of scale, the reduced cost, that can apply 
to the whole of production, is considerably more important than the trade effects.'2
However, the political motives of the founders of the European Community ensured them 
a positive view of the economic consequences of mutual tariff disarmament. They were 
impressed by the scope that the large American market gave for efficient output of items
and P.Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case 
of the Missing Foreign Tariffs- or, Beware of the Large Country Assumption', Working Papers, University
of Maryland, 1980: and American Economic Review, September 1981.
'**R.C.Hine, The Political Economy o f  European Trade, Brighton, Whcatshcaf Books, 1985, p.52.
’ ' Bela Balassa,' Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market: An Appraisal o f  
the Evidened, in Balassa (ed.), Furopean Economic Integration, Amsterdam, 1975, M.Miller and .I.Spenccr,
'The Static Economic Effect of the UK .loining the EEC: A General Equilibrium Approach', Review o f
Economic Studies, Feb. 1977, pp.71 -93.
Corden, 'Economies of Seale and Customs Union Theory', Joiuiml o f Political Economy, May/Junc
i972.·
such as aircraft and machine^ for mass production. The Germans, Belgians and Dutch, 
later on French and Italian, industrialists were interested in the wider market.
Although estimates of the terms of trade are rare, it is thought to be of 'considerable 
relative importance' when compared with the static welfare effects. On the contrary, many 
economists failed to break the mould of static equilibrium analysis and focus sharply on 
tlie dynamic effects inside the common market.
IV. SPAIN: ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
When Spain's accession period to the EC is analyzed, it is observed that the country has 
follQwcd up a series of improvements in inflation, output, employment and the external 
accounts. Although it is not the only reason, the adjustment proeess can be considered to 
be one of the' countiy's most significant achievements. Being previously an extremely 
conservative market, Spain implemented reforms in its product, labor, and financial 
markets, and this was chased by an opening up of the balance of payments. The financial 
and structural reform moves were for the purpose of preparation to the European Single 
Market. The economic program implemented by the Spanish authorities over the period 
1982-1986 was a combination of stabilization policies and gradual structural reforms. 
This strategy allowed for the country adjust to domestic and external imbalances.
IV.U MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Spain has left the self-sufficiency goal since 1959, and at the same time the first 
economic plan was drafted.'^ This, in turn, helped the country achieve an outstanding 
economic growth when compared to the other European countries. Spain has had a more 
significant stock and a faster rate of expansion than Portugal (and Greece, as well). The 
Spanish economy has faced a gradual opening to the foreign capital, while doubling in 
size (in GDP terms) during the 1960s and aiming to do so again in the 1970s until the 
onset of the 1973 oil crisis. Since Spain was heavily dependent on the imported energy 
supplies, the crisis showed its effects on Spain's balance of payments as in the form of 
foreign debt. The debt increased from US $3.6 billion in 1973 to US $24 billion in 1981.
'^Data in this section arc provided from the OliCD Coutry Studies and riconomie Surveys for Spain 
(1983-1988),
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By the year 1984, approximately half of the workforee was employed by the serviee 
industry. The unemployment rate, which was raising steadily since 1977 has reached to 
21.5 per cent of the total workforce in 1985. In other terms, the number of registered 
unemployed equaled 2.9 million. This was namely due to several factors such as the 
return of Spanish workers abroad, who have faced redundancies, encouragement of 
women, in the post-Franco era, to take place in the Spanish labor force (which led to an 
increase in the overall demand for jobs), and the population growth rate of Spain which 
was well above the EC average, and continues to be so.
In 1984, the EC absorbed 49.1 per cent of Spain's exports and supplied 33.4 per cent of 
its imports. While the service industry took the greatest share from the active workforce 
pie, manufacturing ranked the second employer with a share of 25.4 per cent, and 
agriculture the third with 17.8. The remaining, totaling approximately 7 per cent, was 
employed by construction sector. In 1985, agriculture accounted for 9 per cent of Spain's 
GDP, and agricultural exports represented about 20 per cent of total exports. The largest 
customer of Spanish exports was the Community itself (60 per cent). Therefore, Spanish 
integration to the EC would increase the areas in use for agricultural purposes by 30 per 
cent and the agricultural workforce by 25 per cent. On the other hand, it would be 
impossible for the dairy industry to survive after the customs union because of the high 
product quality standards and insufficient capital for livestock investment. The Treaty of 
Accession established a seven-year transition period for non-sensitive Spanish exports to 
the EC during which customs duties would gradually be abolished. In addition, fruit and 
vegetables, being considered as Spain's sensitive products, would have a ten-year 
transition period during which the EC promised to reduce its external tariffs on an 
increasing scale.
As in case of Portugal, in the mid-1980s, the Spanish industry was dominated by many 
small enterprises. These firms were operating with a small (or almost no) use of 
technological innovation, and 93 per cent of the industrial companies were employing 
less than 25 workers. When the integration to the EC was accomplished, these enteiprises 
would face a great competition, resulting from lack of both greater financial resources 
and economies of scale, achieved by European firms.
The common features of Spain's steel industry with other West European steel producers, 
in 1980s, were namely excess capacity, overmanning, and low productivity. However,
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Spain succeeded in developing export markets when faced with a reduction in home 
demand, and ranked seventh largest exporter (of steel products) in the world.
Producing 1.17 million vehicles in 1984, Spain ranked as the sixth largest car 
manufacturer, and 61 per cent of its production was exported. From the point of view of 
foreign direct investment, the main car manufacturers (i.e. General Motors, Citroen, 
Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, and Nissan) had already set production in the country. Spain's 
national car producer, SEAT, signed an agreement with Volkswagen to share technology 
and to market VW models in Spain, in year 1983.
IV.2. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Spain needed to adopt an economic reform program, namely Stabilization Plan, when it 
joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation in 1959. This program allowed the 
country to implement an open policy towards foreign investment, and to overcome the 
growing current deficit on the balance of payments. The reform was plamied to uphold 
the shortage of domestic savings and the lag in technological development.
On 27 July 1959, general guidelines, for participation in Spanish enterprises by foreign 
investors and Spaniards residing abroad, were introduced by a Decree. From that time on, 
the restrictions, on capital repatriation and profit transfers stemming from investments 
signed, were all abolished. In addition to the above Decree, Government introduced 
another one in 1963 to fully "liberalize foreign investment in 18 major industrial sectors 
by lifting restrictions on the percentage of capital that foreign firms and other non­
residents could invest."
Within the 1953-1972 period, the main industries benefiting from this restructuring were 
the chemical industries, motor vehicles, hotel industry, and metal and mechanical sectors. 
The foreign investment had reached to a peak of 14 billion pesetas (US $230 million) in 
1972. Following year, the Ministry of Industiy issued a Decree which brought a new 
legislation to consolidate the major provisions of previous laws into a single document
'^'Thc liC Fact Book.
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(Decree No. 3021). By this paper, Government announced its aim of applying a more 
selective procedure for foreign investment.
....The approval of new foreign majority inveslmenls was to beeome eondilional upon three 
criteria: exporting, local sourcing of raw materials and local research and development.... 
although foreign participation above 50 per cent required special government 
authorization, the latter was liberally granted provided that at least one major contribution 
to the Spanish economy could be anticipated from the result of the foreign invesiment.
As ;i result, the submission (two-stage) process for the prospective foreign investor was 
not that easy.
The authoriz.ation procedure ranged from four to six weeks for a comparatively small 
metal-working unit to eight months for a multi-million dollar ehemieal plant...Most 
effected by the delays were pharmaceutical companies which regarded as unrealistic the 
Spanish Government's efforts to induce them to set up costly research and development 
facilities in Spain.
The control mechanisms were not all that. Another one consisted of industrial permits 
required by the Ministry of Industry. Whatever the degree of foreign ownership, 
industries were separated into three classes.
• industries where permits were granted on a case-by-case basis (including public 
utilities, mining, motor vehicles, electrical appliances, and the proeessing of oil)
• industries where pennits were granted subject to the fulfillment of certain technical of 
minimum capacity requirements and local content rules (including textiles, metal 
products and machinery, some chemicals and foodstuffs)
• industries not mentioned above, permits were granted without restrictions.
For the sectors including national defense and private security services, public 
information agencies, newspapers and publishing, film production and broadcasting, the 
exploitation of mercury mines, and water for public consuifiption, foreign participation 
was forbidden.
In the air transport and public utilities sectors, the foreign investor docs not require any 
authorization for the first 25 per cent of capital invested; the same rule applies to the first 
40 per cent of foreign capital invested in shipping and oil refining and 49 per cent in
^^In this section, the paragraphs in small characters are provided from the study of Buckley and Artisien 
on the employment impact of multinational enterprises in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
* ^Buckley and Artisien, pg. 15.
17Ibid.
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mining....in Spain's less developed areas ineliide eapital ineentives (in the form of cash 
grants and long-term loans) and a variety of tax and tariff reductions for new or expanding 
industries in growth centers... Additional benefits are also available to investments in 
industries considered to be of preferential or national interest: a law introduced in January 
1977 (No.6) conferred tax and financial benefits on mining companies.**^
Under the consideration of the implementations achieved on foreign investment plans, the 
Government needed to introduce new Decrees by the year 1981. These were mainly for 
the decentralization of the authorization procedure, in order to reduce the time required to 
process applications, and for regulations of the conditions under which authorizations are 
made, to reduce the element of discretion. By the Decrees of 1981, it was stated that:
1. if foreign participation exceeds 50 per cent, the investment is considered foreign to 
the extent of such participation.
2. if foreign participation is 25 per cent or if there is Spanish Government participation 
then the investment is treated as domestic.
3. if a foreign firm holds less than 50 per cent of the capital of a Spanish company, but 
exercises effective managerial control, the company is treated as foreign investment.
The foreign investment can take the form of capital, patents and know-how, and plant and 
machinery (being subject to the general import duties).
IV.3. TERMS OF ACCESSION
The discussions have been followed upon a wide range of issues and policies, such as 
transportation, regional policy, capital movements, economic and financial policy, rights 
of establishment, coal and steel, external relations, Euratom, harmonization of laws, 
taxation, social affairs, agriculture, fisheries, budget contributions and institutions as well 
as customs union. But, above all, since Spain had a large supply of low-cost labor and 
this labor power would be free to enter in the Common Market and compete for available 
jobs (especially threatening France), the labor mobility issue was resolved by postponing 
the free flow of labor into other Community states for a number of years.
In addition, the farmed area in the EC had expanded upon the Spanish entry by 30 
percent, whereas potential consumers had only increased by 14 percent, potentially 
yielding even more of the surpluses that had plagued the Community. Spain, leaning
' ^^Biickley and Artisicn, pg. 16.
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heavily on agriculture, demanded a rationalization of the CAP that would substitute 
direct income support payments to poor farmers, because the current support system was 
actually working for the rich (and northern) farmers.
Some issues were mainly due to specific products. Although the EC was self-sufficient in 
olive oil production, Spain presented an additional amount which would cause an 
increase in surplus volume. The addition of Spanish oil was estimated to cost the CAP 
more than ECU 800 million each year. Spanish fruits (especially citrus) and vegetables 
were serious candidates to compete with many Italian, Greek and Southern French 
products. Wine, which did not always elicit a disinterested response from the French in 
the past, was another significant competitive import.
The size of the Spanish fleet equaled almost 70 percent of tlie EC total. This caused 
arguments on issues such as fishing access to EC waters. This, in turn, required a long 
transition period.
Since Spanish industry, in contrast to agriculture, was relatively non-competitive, it also 
received a period of seven years transition to restructure the enhanced competition.
1V.4. STRUCTURAL REFORMS
ft would not be possible for Spain to directly enter an integration with the EC and have a 
customs union without having a prior formation change. The achievements were the 
results of the social consensus which had emerged after 1975, and the successive 
adjustment programs and structural reforms of 1960s and 1970s.
Main moves can be stated as the elimination of most price and wage controls, the fiscal 
reforms, the re-structuring of the industrial sector and banking system, the efforts to 
increase the efficiency of the nationalized productive sector, and the privatization of the 
most profitable public companies (Appendix I). Spanish economy became able to move 
towards a market-oriented economy from an administered one by implementing the 
reforms successfully.
Although Spain had eliminated most of the economic imbalances, threatening the country 
for the period between 1970-1980, as it integrated into the EC, there were still
weaknesses (lack of technological Imow-how, avoidance of competition, banking and 
service sector regulations, etc.) in the functioning of the labor, goods, and the financial 
markets. The public monopolies, including energy, transportation, and communication, 
and the private cartels did not allow for a just competition due to the regulations.
The gross saving ratio decreased from 28 per cent in 1974, to 21 per cent in 1985, and 
this appeared as another threatening factor to the sustainable growth. The increase in the 
budget deficit was not possible to avoid. As expected, the costs were not only in terms of 
economics but social as well. Since the EC membership required some core standards, 
Spain was, for sure, in need of re-structuralization in the form of continuous social and 
economic reforms. Spain would be better able to gain credibility towards its financial 
policies by joining the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism).
As a summary, the commercial protection between EC and Spain would be phased out by 
following a progressive and reciprocal procedure. The above given transition periods 
were designed to facilitate the integration and not to make better off one side while 
worsening off the other. By the trade liberalization act, Spain aimed to increase its 
economic openness from 18.1 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 22.6 percent of GDP in 1990.'^ 
This act would also allow for a convergence between the prices of EC and Spanish traded 
goods sector. On the other hand, in the beginning of the integration process, the trade 
balance would be negatively effected. However, an important shift in the geographic 
composition of Spain's trade was recorded in favor of the EC countries.^o
Spain had the least comparative advantage in industrial goods. Due to the progressive 
removal of irhport protection on these goods, the imbalance in Spain's exports to and 
imports from EC member states deteriorated form a surplus of 6.7 per cent in 1985 to a 
deficit of 16.4 per cent in 1989 (and later on to 13.6 per cent in 1991). This was also 
made easier by the elimination of export subsidies after the introduction oi the value 
added tax (VAT) system.^'
The key ingredients of the stabilization effort were namely "the failure to secure greater 
price stability and the rapid deterioration of the fiscal accounts" (Pastor, 1993). These
' ‘Vialy,M., Pastor,G„ and Pujol,T,, Spain: Converging with the European Community, IMF Publications,
Washington DC, February 1993.
^^^OECD Economic Survey-Spain, 1988.
21OECD Economic Survey-Spain, 1993.
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factors, thus, reduced the public's confidence in the Government's coiTimitment to reduee 
inflation.
The trade liberalization act caused to alter the resource allocation stmcture in Spain and 
the countries in question. In the period 1986-1990 the net trade diversion equaled to 1 per 
cent of total trade. Since the agricultural products were not treated as favorable as the 
industrial goods, this brought the diversion movement with it.^ 2
In addition to the above conditions, "the competitive pressure effect was doubled by the 
introduction of stabilization or appreciation of peseta on the sectors most exposed to 
competition". Spain was extremely successful in following up the EC directives when 
activating the adjustment process. Therefore, Spanish financial market became able to 
have a voice in the international markets.
Capital liberalization helped financing of the current account deficit and led to a boost in 
domestic investment. To attract foreign direet investment and sustained flow of long term 
capital, some motivation factors were designed and introduced. While the motivators for 
portfolio investors were high interest rates and stabilization of peseta, these were low 
labor costs, stable political and social environment, and the dynamics of the EC 
integration process for the direct investors. IMF report on Spain's adjustment proeess 
shows that, net foreign direct investments grew at an average annual growth rate of 45 per 
cent over the period 1985-1990.
The FDls concentrated on the service sector, especially financial services, right after the 
accession. Those activities were highly profitable, in addition to their being concealed 
from competition.
The most visible improvement was achieved in the manufaetured goods sector, because 
in this sector the Spanish producers were directly exposed to European competition. In 
the agricultural sector, the Spanish prices were adjusted to EC intervention prices 
imposed by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Therefore, an increase in food prices
^^ Ibid.
^^üaly,M., Pastor,G., and Pujol,T., 
Washington DC, February 1993.
24lbid.
Spain: Converging with the European Coimnunity, IMF Publications,
23
was not possible to be prevented (Appendix III). Higher price increases were observed in 
the non-traded goods sector due to the market structures and lower productivity.
To reduce market rigidities, Spain accelerated the implementation of structural reforms, 
riie Spanish Goveimment introduced various development programs after the accession to 
the EC in order to improve the competitiveness of the Spanish industry which had to 
encounter customs union, to reduce Spain's dependence on the imported energy and to 
favor a more balanced regional development. On the other hand, all these programs were 
not merely supported by the Government, but also the EC financing.
Galy entitles the reasons for the structural reforms as the means:
• to improve the allocation of resources,
• to facilitate market mechanisms, and
• to eliminate or restrict the monopoly power of the private sector.
Even though the weight of the public companies in the Spanish economy was well 
beyond the European standards, the 1981-1984 rationalization program was combined 
with the privatization act aiming to reduce this ratio. The measures implemented to ease 
rigidities in labor market were part of an effort to support the financial stabilization 
program by much needed stmctural reforms. An Industrial Reconversion Program^^ was 
designated to restructure most affected sectors of Spanish Industry, including steel, 
shipbuilding and textiles. The program provided budgetary support to a process of 
retrenchment involving substantial employment reductions, compensation and retraining 
for those affected, and an investment program intended to accelerate the modernization of 
key industrial sectors.
Heavy investment in energy-intensive sectors (i.e. steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding), 
together with an unavoidable dependence on imported energy, had left the country 
vulnerable to external shocks, as in case of oil crisis. As well as the stmctural reforms.
2^Thc IMF report explains the program as an "attempt to lessen the soeial eosts assoeiated with the proeess 
of retrenchment through a number of complementary measures aimed at facilitating the return to the labor 
force of those workers who lost their jobs. Fiscal and financial incentives were set up for firms willing to 
settle in those geographic areas most affected by the reconversion. Workers over 55 were given the option 
of taking early retirement while others received severance payments and unemployment compensation for 
up to 18 months. Workers were also given the option of surrendering their severance payment to the 
[employment Promotion Fund, whose revenues would be used to supplement unemployment benefits, and 
through retraining, to assist the workers in seeking new employment opportunities, offering subsidies to 
firms willing to hire them on a permanent basis."
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and the trade and capital liberalization moves, Spain gave special importance to the 
energy planning. Since the Government decided to reduce the imported energy 
dependence of the country, the plan, briefly, aimed to reduce the energy consumption, 
and was renewed in 1991. Energy policy emphasized the need to increase the share of 
domestic sources in total energy consumption, and in conjunction with demand and 
supply oriented policies implemented as part of the National Energy Plan. The share of 
natural gas and renewable resources in the final demand of energy was forecasted to 
exceed 9 per cent in the energy balance. The domestically produced coal would remain 
the main source of energy. As for the oil, the prices would follcnv the same trend with the 
international market. Special consideration would be given to the environmental factors.
EC has developed structural funds to aid regional development programs in the member 
states, and Spain appears as one of the most benefiting countries from these grants. 
Although the funds are designed to reduce the imbalances in Spain, their effectiveness is 
questionable. The stmctural funds, Spain benefited from, are namely European Social 
Fund (ESF), European Fund for Regional Development (ERDF), and Fund for 
Agricultural Development (EAGGF). The net transfers to Spain, in 1990, represented 0.3 
per cent of the GDP.
Financial Liberalization
Operating under tight and protectionist regulations, the Spanish financial system needed 
to move towards a liberalization. Pastor states in his studies that, 'The banking activities 
were highly protected against competition, and far from being innovative. The sector was 
dominated by the large banlcs, who also have big stakes in the industry.' In order to 
achieve the requirements stated in the EC directives, the authorities implemented a set of 
actions.
The most visible move was in the form of deregulation of the banking system. In order to 
facilitate competition, throughout the period 1969-1987 the interest rates were liberalized. 
Institutional segmentation was revised to overcome the operational problems it brought 
forth.
The Spanish banking system would be regulated under the principles set in the Second 
Banking Directive. For the foreign banks, it is stated that.
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...any bank authorized by its home member slate will be able to provide a wide array of 
banking services in any EC country. This is the so-called single banking license 
provision....permits host countries to enforce their own rules on liquidity, business conduct, 
and investor protection rules.
In Spain, it would not be possible to have more than four branches for the foreign 
banks till 1990. This number was extended in the following years by one or two.
Being subject to the capital adequacy, limits to branching have been liberalized 
outside their geographical region of operation since 1989.
For the domestic investors, creation of new banks was due to the approval of the 
Ministiy of Economy and Finance. During the severe banking crisis, the investors 
who are willing to enter banking sector were forced to buy and rename an existing 
bank which was small or almost in bankrupt.
Effects of Financial Liberalization
Although it is not very cost efficient, the Spanish banking system proved to be sound 
from the point of view of solvency and financial margin. The cost perspective, on the 
other hand, brought the most dense branch network in Europe. Pastor^f', in his study, 
states that either Spain was over-banked in relation to other European countries or 
financial services are overpriced because o f inefficiencies or non-coinpetitive pricing or 
both.
The increasing number of small and medium-sized banks led to a decrease in bank 
concentration through 1987. Being far away from innovative operations, the Spanish 
banks were introduced new financial services and new technology when implementing 
their activities by the foreign banks. Those competitors allowed for the interbank market 
and initiated merchant banlciiig.^ "^
The financing mechanisms of the economy were deepened by the financial liberalization. 
The market stmetures changed. Capital allocation procedures, concentration ratios, and 
bank mergers were all directly affected. Banking industry had to face competition which, 
in turn, brought the need of innovation of activities.
2^ ’Ga1y,M., Pastor,G., and Pujol,T., 
Washington DC, February 1993.
Spain: Converging with the European Community, im f  Publications,
2'7|bid.
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The Spanish financial markets were not that sophisticated to stand against the free capital 
inflows. The stock exchange was segmented, and suffered lack of depth. Therefore, until 
the country's accession to the EC in 1986, these inflows were under the tight control 
determined by the provision of the Act of Foreign Investment (1974). Since the policy 
conflicts even arose after the entiy to the ERM, some capital controls were introduced.
Capital controls served to different set of purposes all aiming to reduce capital mobility. 
The non-residents were not allowed (or limited) to speculate against the peseta. Their 
access to the Spanish capital markets were restricted.
Another set of capital control measures aimed to dampen short-term capital outflows. 
Unless the balances wei'e of the international trade or denominated in ECU, the residents 
were prohibited to hold deposits in foreign currencies.28
In addition, the Spanish stock exchange was monitored and foreign asset issuance was 
regulated. While manipulating resident foreign borrowing, transitory measures were 
designed to prevent the unjustified appreciation of peseta.
Personal Income Tax Reform
Although not right after the accession, Spain felt the need to simplify the tax system. This 
reform was activated starting from 1991, and served the purposes of'reducing the number 
of taxes, rates, and special regimes, as well as minimizing distortions in resource 
allocations' (Pastor, 1993). What was targeted was 'a more unified tax treatment of 
investments in financial and real assets' and 'a more lenient treatment of capital income 
earned by non-residents'. Besides, it provided incentives for the small investor.
The income tax reform took different forms for residents and non-residents (from EC or 
third countries). For non-residents from EC countries, it eliminated the payment of 
withholding taxes on interest income and taxes on capital gains resulting from the 
purchase and sale of financial assets issued in Spain. Meanwhile, for non-residents from 
third countries, exemptions would be due to bilateral agreements.
2^C()unlry Studies, Spain, Commission of the l iiiropean Communities Direetoraie, Number 7, March 92.
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IV.5. SPAIN AND CUSTOMS UNION
With Spain, as formerly with Greece, the first area to be mostly dealt with, in the entry 
negotiations, was the customs union. This concept was a product of the Community, 
therefore they would have no, or relatively less difficulties, in establishing a union in a 
short time for all products. The Commission determined the transition period to be 
between 5 to 10 years. On the other hand, Spain, insisting on the longer option, wanted a 
single transition period both for the industiy and the agriculture. This was mainly due to a 
compensation of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides.
Spain had exploited the Trade Agreement of 1970 which allowed it to maintain high 
protective barriers on imports and to export successfully to the Community. The reason 
why ■ the customs union was intended to be activated as soon as possible was that. 
Community was in a superior industrial position than Spain, they had large investments 
in the Iberia (e.g. cars), and South European markets were seen relatively buoyant for the 
kind of goods which had been the staple of European industries during the long boom.
Spain was highly competitive in traditional industries, such as textiles, leather goods, 
steel and ships. The Confederation of British Industries suggested that safeguards 
(allowed in Article 226 of the Treaty of Rome for the transition period) be built into the 
accession treaties with the new entrants as regards to some sectors.
Under the above considerations, the new members, by asking to join the Community, had 
to face open market competition, and dismantle their non-tariff barriers. In addition, even 
though they had the right to prolong the transition periods, (e.g. in steel) such a decision 
should be approved by the Community.
Spain and Greece were at an important stage in their industrial growth when they need to 
move from reliance on the traditional industries, such as textiles, to more advanced ones 
influenced by product imiovation and specialization. Spain, which was in many ways 
comparable to Italy with a time lag of a few years, was well advanced in this direction, 
but was still relatively weak in the capital goods and the high technology. For Portugal, 
the distance to be covered, was too long without substantial aid and time.
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V. PORTUGAL: ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
Portugal has always been the land on the edge, caught between traditional ways of living 
-fishing and farming- and the technology and integration. It lays on 34,332 square miles 
(88,944 km^) with a population of under 10 million.
When compared to Spain, the Portuguese accession to EC was not that debatable. 
Community did not have great expectations towards Portugal, except in textiles and wine, 
because Portugal was the poorest in Western Europe. However, it had a great interest 
(along with Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Britain) in expanding social and regional 
funding. In addition, labor was also possible to be attracted by the higher wages in other 
EC states.
V.1. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
According to the OECD figures, the unemployment rate in Portugal has reached to 9.8 
per cent of the total labor force, which equaled 448,700 people by the end of 1983.2  ^This 
was also worsened by the I'eturn of migrant workers and the arrival of residents from 
former colonies. The country has ranked one of the poorest in Europe with respect to per 
capita income, and with a gross domestic product of US $2,398.
In the pre-accession period, the sectoral breakdown of the labor force shows that most of 
the work-force was distributed to manufacturing and agriculture. On the other hand, the 
agricultural sector, although employing approximately 23 per cent of working population, 
only accounted for 6 per cent of the GDP. The low productivity in the farming industiy 
was an important concern when arranging the terms of accession to the EC, in order to 
fall in line with the Community agricultural policy and implementations.
The manufacturing sector accounted for 85 per cent of Portugal's exports. The activities 
were mainly labor-intensive, and relied on mainly low technology production under 
traditional specialization in low cost. Because of the above reasons, the products were 
unsophisticated, when compared to EC's, such as textiles, leather goods, and woodwork. 
The industry needed a serious improvement to secure a share from the foreign markets.
2‘h)iUa in this section arc provided from OECD Economic Surveys on Portugal for the years 1986-1990.
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since the input obtained from the migrant workers had declined, and also to overcome the 
foreign debt.
The sectors owned by or under the control of the state, namely steel, petrochemical, 
brewing, cement and engineering industries, have started to stagnate because of some 
external as well as internal factors. The interest rates on borrowing abroad have risen and 
Escuedo has depreciated. While keeping the wage increases below inflation, the 
Government decided to reorganize these 'nationalized' industries. It was made easier for 
the companies to lay off the surplus labor by new legislation. In addition to these, the 
linns whieh acquire and get use of modern technology were better, and under easy terms, 
able to reach capital.
Almost 25 per cent of the total exports were of the textiles products. However, the firms 
operating in this sector, being large in number, were all small employing less than 50 
workers. This has allowed the country to work with lower labor costs than the EC 
member states. Therefore, Portugal had to accept some severe terms with regards to 
integration of her textiles into the EC.
By the years 1.984-1986, the EC countries made up over 65 per cent of Portugal's exports 
and over 55 per cent of its imports. The depreciation of the Escuedo in 1983 resulted in 
an increasing share of export markets, particularly to the EC. The strength of the counti-y's 
foreign trade lied in textiles, clothing, leather goods, footwear and the wood industiy. On 
the other hand, it was very dependent on exports of primary products, which made her 
vulnerable to sudden changes in those products' terms of trade. Starting from the 1980s, 
new industries, such as electrical and electronic equipment, transport equipment, and 
petrochemicals, were introduced and developed. These had a positive effect on the export 
performance.
Especially in the energy sector, Portugal had a high import bill, which was dominated by 
the mineral products (e.g. crude oil), because the country had exploited few of its natural 
resources.
Portugal designed a trade policy to prepare the economy for EC accession. While 
gradually rempving the import barriers, it was allowed to maintain tariffs on some EC 
imports until 1993. Some exports to the other member states were under reduced tariffs 
and increased quotas.
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V.2. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
In order to co-ordinate, supervise, and authorize foreign direct investment, the Portuguese 
Government established the Foreign Investment Institute, following the 1974 revolution. 
The rules governing foreign investment were set out in the Foreign Investment Code, 
enacted by Decree-Law 348/77 of 24 August 1977, and amended by Decree-Law 174/82 
of 12 May 1982. The Code was revised in 1986.
Buckley and Artisien (1987) state that, the 1977 law had outlined the Government's 
concern for greater diversification of investment sources and more selective sectoral 
distribution.
Under the 'general regime', foreign firms are entitled to all the ineentives available within 
Portuguese legislation without any discrimination regarding the origin of the foreign 
capital, direct foreign investment, which is subject to the "contractual regime", benefits 
from additional incentives (of a fiscal or other nature), reflecting the host country's three- 
pronged economic policy: to promote its export oriented industries, to reduce its 
dependence on imports and to attract foreign capital to its cheap supplies of domestic 
labor. The list of 'priority' industries includes mining, fishing, processing of organic and 
inorganic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food processing, textile and apparel manufaeturing, 
cork and leather products, furniture, and refining of non-ferrous metals.
Three major objectives underlie Portugal's order of priority industries earmarked for 
foreign investment. First, to encourage foreign investment in heavy industry which draws 
on domestic supplies of raw materials (in particular iron ore, copper, lead, zinc); secondly, 
to develpp the international competitiveness of traditional industries such as textiles.
Although Portugal's exports of textiles to the EC are subject to quotas, the unsuitability of 
some products for European markets means that the value of exports often fall short of the 
permitted quota. A third objective is to attract foreign investment in industries where 
Portugal already has a technological or other comparative advantage (i.e. light electrical 
equipment, electronics, and telecommunication equipment).
The Portuguese Government introduced the system of integrated investment incentives, 
in May 1980, to promote the foreign investment. The scheme did not discriminate
30Buckley and Artisicn, pg. 13.
between Portuguese and foreign capital, and was based on a point system derived from 
economic performance, sectoral priorityisuch as basic chemicals, minerals, or food 
processing), and regional priority criteria (i.e. high points for an investment bringing in 
capital in priority sectors, and located in a less developed region). This system consisted 
of a variety of fiscal and financial incentives as in the form of tax holidays, interest rate 
subsidies and grants. The foreign investors would be able to exempt from (or a 50 per 
cent reduction on) conveyance tax on property purchase, manufacturing and 
complementary taxes for up to nine years, value added tax on gains from capital 
increases, capital gains tax on loan interest, in addition to the speedy write-offs (up to 12 
years) of property assets.
Some sectors including insurance, public services, and armament were considered to be 
closer to private capital. Therefore, Portugal did not allow foreign direct investment in 
these areas.
I he State guarantees the transfer abroad of dividends and profits after deductions have 
been made for legal amortization and taxes. No restrictions exist on the transfer abroad of 
the proceeds arising from the sale or liquidation of a foreign investment, unless there is a
significant deterioration in the host country's balance of payments.... a further guarantee
that the sum transferred per year shall not be less (ban 20 per cent of the total value.
(Financial Times, March 18, 1986)^^
Foreign Direct Investment in Portugal followed an increasing trend prior to the accession 
to and customs union with the EC. This was mainly observed in the service industries 
(although manufacturing sector included chemicals, metal manufacture and machinery, 
basic metals, paper and printing, and other manufactures).
V.3. TERMS OF ACCESSION
Portugal's first application was realized in 1977. This was not a successful start since the 
policy implementation and the laws in regulation were not consistent with the integration 




Although the Accession Agreement between Portugal and the EC, that was signed on 
12th June 1985, was expected to have major medium- and long-term implications for the 
Portuguese economy, starting from 1986 these effects became visible in some specific 
areas (Appendix II). The Agreement has provided for two types of transitional 
arrangement for the agricultural issue. Due to the conventional arrangement, a seven year 
transitional period at the end of which the prices of the products in question (e.g. tobacco 
and sugar) should be fully aligned on those applying in the EC. However, the majority of 
the agricultural products, that were significant for Portugal (e.g. grain, rice, milk, fruit 
and vegetables, wine, most meats) were subject to transitional arrangements comprising 
two live-year periods. Portugal began to introduce a package of measures designed to 
bring prices and subsidies into line with those of EC during the first five years. On the 
other hand the harmonization process to be applied in the second period was mandatory 
and should be completed by the end of 1996. In the following seven or ten years, customs 
duties and quotas would also be phased out.
The arrangement consists of a seven-year transition period for the Portuguese industry. 
Since customs duties were lower by then on most industrial goods, an important effect of 
membership appeared as in the form of the removal of the quantity restraints on trade. It 
was also agreed that, trade barriers between Portugal and Spain would be progressively 
lowered with a five-year transition period for certain sensitive goods such as textiles, 
starting from 1st January 1986.
In order to minimize the risk factor, in some areas, the Portuguese authorities have 
needed to monitor developments very closely and to ensure that the financial resources 
they receive were used efficiently. In the short term, Portugal seemed to have greater 
opportunities for exports of certain industrial goods, such as textiles, which were formerly 
subject to strict quotas. In addition its exports of light industrial products to Spain were 
expected to increase. Another promising aspect for Portugal was a probable significant 
rise in the foreign direct investment in Portugal because of the low labor costs.
The most obvious risks were on Portugal's ability to make full use of the resources 
received from the EC because of the poor state of its public finances. The bulk of 
Community aid necessitated substantial counteipart funds, and Portugal hesitated about 
reaching the resources, which represented additional expenditure, given the low level of 
public investment (OECD Country Surveys, 1986). From the beginning of the second 
five-year period, a price shock, affecting certain agricultural goods, the scale depending
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on comparative price trends in the EC and the rest of the world, was expeeted. 
Unemployment was also considered to be open to a rise if labour shedding in agriculture 
was not matched by increased numbers of jobs in industry and the serviees. One of the 
major unloiown factors in Portugal's membership was the eapaeity of Portuguese 
agriculture to adjust stiffer competition and improve yields significantly. On the other 
hand, this avenue seemed to be an opportunity towards suceessful EC entiy rather than a 
threat.
For the first six years following entry, Portugal was refunded a gradually diminishing 
sliarc of her contribution, although transfer to the Cormnunity of customs receipts was 
based on national production, when analysis is from the balance of payments and budget 
perspectives. The respective values were 87, 70, 55, 40, 25, and 5 per eent from 1986 to 
1991 (OECD Survey, 1992).
In 1991, at the end of the first transition period, with respect to the Accession Agreement 
articles, Portugal may be required to pay monetary compensatory amounts if the prices of 
her products are not fully harmonized with her European partners. Portugal received 
project-linked, credits. The transfer sources were whether European Soeial Fund, ERDF, 
or EAGGF.
The free movement of Portuguese workers to EC countries, except tor Luxembourg, was 
made possible after a seven-year transitional period. As for Luxembourg, this period was 
lengthened to ten years. After transitional periods of five to seven years, Portugal would 
start to apply the rules concerning eapital movements that were already applieable in EC 
member states. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment in Portugal would gradually be 
liberalized over a period of four years.
Following the accession to the EC, and overcoming a long period of economic difficulty, 
the country achieved an improvement in economic ternis. However, it will be misleading 
to connect all this achievement to integration. Some part of the eeonomic performance 
was attributable to the improving world context, and, in addition, the recession faced in 
1983-1984 was followed by a natural recoveiy period.
In general terms, 'output growth picked up markedly to 4‘/2 per eent on average from 1986 
to 1990, as against 3 per cent in the preceding decade, the unemployment rate was eut in
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half by 1990, and the rate of inflation, whieh had exceeded 20 per cent was brought down 
to an average of less than 12 per cent' (OECD Country Studies, 1992).
Portugal was aware of the need of solving its structural problems in order to improve the 
long-run macroeconomic performance. Therefore the adjustment progress has been 
accomplished in the structure of production and in improving the functioning of markets.
V.4; EC STRUCTURAL FUNDS
Being integrated to the EC, Portugal acquired rights to get use of the EC structural funds. 
Financial inflows from structural funds represented over I per cent of GDP in 1986-1987 
period. The funds were aimed to help satisfy the real economic convergence. Some of 
them were in the form of infrastructural investments for overcoming Portugal's major 
problems in transportation, communications, teclmology, and health care. By improving 
education and increasing occupational training, human capital formation would be 
stimulated. In addition, a special ECU 700 million fund was set up to assist the 
adjustment of the agricultural sector. EC incentive programs were designed to accelerate 
private physical capital formation.^  ^ Meanwhile, as an indirect approach to improve 
product quality, business was made able to get assistance in form of management 
consulting.
Howevei', as it was for Spain, it is open to question whether these funds were efficiently 
spent or not, since their incremental effects can not be traced that easily and independent 
of the other factors.
V.5. STRUCTURAL REFORMS
In order to facilitate and smooth the integration process into the EC, Portugal needed to 
follow a number of structural reforms. These were aimed to ease the adjustment steps by 
improving the functioning of the markets.
incentive programs eovered 20-40 per cent of the costs of eligible innovation and modernization 
expenditures and 50-70 per cent of R&D.
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Privatization
Market mechanisms in Portugal were suffering from the lack of reliance. In order to 
conquer this problem, the Portuguese authorities decided to reduce the role of the 
Government in the productive sector. As a second step, the finances of the public 
corporations would be consolidated. These corporations, although not operated and 
managed efficiently, were accounting for a large share of output. When compared with 
their European counterparts, most of the public firms were unproductive and excessively 
capital intensive. These proved to be the quicksands of Government subsidies.
Stai ting from 1988, a series of acts and decrees have been established. They allowed to:
• reduce the burden of State intervention in the economy,
• stimulate the development of capital market by broadening household equity 
ownership,
• cut public indebtedness, and
• improve efficiency.
At the same time, by the introduction of 1988 land reform, collective farms were allowed 
to be privatized. The privatization act, as a whole, improved the financial situation of the 
public firms.
Taxation Reform
Tax reform was carried out through several stages. By the implementation of VAT 
system, an improvement in additional tax revenues was recorded as in the fomi of 2 
percentage points of GDP.^  ^ However, Portugal has not completed the required 
harmonization process of indirect taxation under the EC directives, yet. The 1989 direct 
taxation reform allowed for broadening the base, lowering effective marginal rates and 
diminishing opportunities for avoidance and evasion. Tax incentives to investment were 
based on primarily regional incentives.
Labor Market Reform
Labor market reform was designed to improve unemployment coverage and generosity, 
to facilitate lay-offs, and to restrict the agreements with short-term contracts. By 1995, 
work week was decided to be reduced from 44 to 40 hours. Since there was an unusually 
high degree of wage flexibility by international standards, lack of employment flexibility
*-^()i;CI) liconomic Outlook, 1990.
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was not too costly for the countiy. On the other hand, the wage flexibility helped keep 
real wage increases below gains in labor productivity.
Capital Market
As for the financial liberalization moves, many regulatory changes were introduced. As 
explained for Spanish case, the interest rates were liberalized. No matter their type or 
ownership structure, the competition between different financial intermediaries was 
phased out. Capital controls were designed to monitor the capital outflows, as well as 
inflows, and finally monetary control was modified in order to end the access to credit 
ceilings.
Product Market Adjustment
Prior to the accession period, in the early 1980s, compared to its European partners, 
Portugal's production and employment stmcture was characterized by a rather high share 
in agriculture and other primary products and low shares in energy and services. As a 
result of the inefficient resource utilization, 20 per cent of the employed population were 
generating less than 10 per cent of the net output. A widening gap among the 
productivities of agriculture and other sectors was observed. Hudson (1985), in his 
research stated that the suffering of productivity was due to the poor education o f farm 
population, inadequate infrastructure in many parts o f the country, an inefficient 
distribution system, and the sub-optimal size o f most farms.
The agricultural activities were supported by the EC through the PEDAP program. 
Investment per cent of value added in this sector increased from 12.5 in 1980 to 17.4 in 
1989. A drastic labor shake-out seemed to come closer because of the downward price 
adjustment toward EC levels. However, this was solved by the imminent retirement of 
many farmers, 40 per cent of whom were over 55.
The industrial sector was, and is, relatively large, and had a more modernized stock of 
capital. The industrial structure proved to be in a dualistic form, with large, capital- 
intensive businesses, side by side with small-scale, labor intensive production.
In addition to the imbalances described above, Portugal faced another weakness as in the 
form of technological dependence. Although the overall ratio of R&D expenditure to 
GDP has risen from 0.34 per cent in 1980 to 0.53 in 1989, the firms' demand for R&D
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lemained insufficient. They continued to rely on technological improvements included in 
imports of machinery and technology licensing from foreign sources.
The textiles sub-sector, which was almost the heart of industrial exports, had to 
encounter an increasing competition from developing countries with or without a 
continuation of Multi-Fiber Arrangement. The marketing channels were not properly 
utilized, and the industry lacked investment. Therefore, studies on product quality 
improvement and product differentiation were conducted.
The fishing sector also benefited from the EC subsidies in order to rationalize and to 
enlarge average boat size.
Factor Market Adjustment
International adjustment for the factor market occurred through the export of labor rather 
than the import of capital. 4.3 million Portuguese citizens are forecasted to live abroad of 
which some 1 million are legally resident in other EC countries. However, Straubhaar 
(1988) considered the aggregate (migratory) flows as unimportant, with Portugal's labor 
market at full employment and in view of the social, cultural, and linguistic barriers. On 
the other hand, the wage and salary gap between Portugal and other EC member states 
most probably would result with a costly emigi'ation of its qualified residents.
As in Spain, there happened to be an increase in the autonomous capital inflows of both 
short and long-term nature. Since foreign direct investment inflows are a vital channel to 
achieve real economic convergence as well as to effect industrial restructuring, Portugal 
made good use of its labor cost advantage which attracted the foreign investors who were 
seeking to set up a local export platform or to share in the extremely high returns 
available on the domestic market. Within manufacturing, the most significant growth was 
achieved in the traditional exporting sectors (textiles, clothing) and in resource-based 
indiistries.
Following the accession, Portugal, like Spain succeeded in reducing its real income 
differential with the EC average. Unemployment declined and participation increased in 
response to the pick-up in productivity outcomes. Nevertheless, this was not the case for 
Spain. Although its real convergence was as fast as in Portugal, the joblessness problem 
proved to be rather considerable. Favorable demographics and rising participation played 
a secondaiy role in the Spanish case.
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in addition, for Portugal, the human capital was enhanced by increasing the school­
leaving age by three years in 1986 and by rapid increases in training expenditures under 
the Community Support Framework. Physical capital intensity was upgraded by capital 
inflows, especially in the form of direct investment. Furthermore, EC structural funds 
became important channels for augmenting the capital intensity of production.'
Due to the massive inflows of private capital and EC transfers, the economy was put in an 
overheated state. Although the inflationaiy impact could have been offset by demand 
reducing stabilization policies, such contractionary efforts remained to be unsuccessful.
V.6. PORTUGAL AND CUSTOMS UNION
By the accession to the EC, Portugal had to face a significant change in its structural 
barriers to trade. Since high-cost domestic supply would be displaced by lower-cost 
production from the EC, trade-creation effects were to be expected. Meanwhile, this 
effect would be offset by welfare reducing trade-diversion when lowest-cost third countiy 
producers were eliminated by competing EC exporters, or even domestic producers 
facing higher domestic protection. The new settings forced the authorities to reduce 
organizational slack, which in turn provided increased competition and improved 
competitiveness. Available scale economies were exploited as a result of the market 
integration.
Following the accession, Portugal experienced a sliaip increase in the share of trade with 
its EC partners.3'* This was more visible on the import side. Another trade impact of the 
customs union, was the concentration of trade among fewer partners.
Both for Spain and Poitugal, the exports and imports became less diversified after the 
customs union. Overall product composition of merchandise trade changed, especially 
from the import side, due to the reduction in purchases of foreign raw materials and semi­
manufactures. As of the exports, the agricultural products, energy, and textiles started to 
lose their importance. The growth was on the crude materials side and some certain
Ihc year 1989, Portugal ranked rourtli among the twelve on this measure. Noteworthy was the 
shrinkage in the US share of the Portugal's agrieultural imports, whieh began prior to aeecssion for supply
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categories of manufactures, including clothing. However, the shift to resource intensive 
industries at the expense of those of labor intensive, was not so significant. Portuguese 
industiy remained to be weak at utilizing economies of scale, R&D activities, and human 
capital inputs.
The tariff reductions allowed for an increase in the share of intra-industry trade, which 
signaled trade creation. Nevertheless, the increase was more rapid for Spain.
VI. TURKEY-EC RELATIONS
Turkey has, in fact, reacted early (1960) to take place in the union that was based to the 
Tretity of Rome (1957). For that time being, most of the current member states were not 
interested in such an integration, and also there were contra-arguments to it, as in case of 
UK's entiy. After coming to terms, in 1963, the Ankara Agreement was signed. Although 
not in-written, the final goal for Turkey was defined to be full membership, and customs 
union would just be a milestone in achieving this mission. The Additional Protocof 
signed in 1970, explained the schedules and procedures of the contracts stated in Ankara 
Agreement. This proves that Customs Union is not a new concept for Turkey. It is just 
the end application of Additional Protocol.
Turkey and the European Community were committed by the Additional Protocol of 
1973, to complete the customs union within 22 years, that is, by 1995. Customs union, 
being conditioned to the membership or postponement is defended by the private sector, 
therefore will be started on 1 Januaiy 1995. The remarkable issues requiring workshop 
will be namely economic, industrial, monetaiy, environmental, cultural, scientific and 
statistical. It is stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Turkey will not be 
demanding money from European Community. In addition to the economic questions in 
mind, EC, also, claims Turkey of not being sensitive on human rights and the rights of 
the minorities. Commission Chairman Jacques Delors stated, in November 1993, that 
"There are no priorities among the countries nominated to become members of the 
European Union. Turkey will certainly become a member one day. But actually it falls on 
your part to show efforts on this issue." These words seem to be a good indicator of the 
uncertainty in the EC accession of Turkey.
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EC, for the first time, is making a customs union agreement with a country that it does 
not embrace. Therefore, Customs Union is believed to bring some problems to both 
parties. One of the primary problems is the loss of government incomes obtained from 
customs tax and funds. The loss on the Turkish part is considered to reach more than 3 
billion dollars, since the three financial protocols (since 1980) have been blocked. On the 
other hand EC has some concerns about the Mass Housing Fund application in Turkey. 
Being an import tax whose proceeds are earmarked for a low cost housing program, this 
fund is claimed to be incompatible with the Additional Protocol and impossible to fit into 
the context of a customs union. In addition, free imports are estimated to bring a burden 
of at least 2 billion dollars to the Turkish Government. Private sector will experience a 
change in the competitive structure of the industries they are acting in, and inevitably 
automotive, durable goods, and electronics and electrical supplies industries will face a 
major disturbance. Although the agreement terms are to minimize the loss of both parties, 
due to the above considerations, EC is obliged to provide financial support to recover this 
loss.
After mid-70s, the relations between EC and Turkey started to get worse off. Of the many 
reasons, Cyprus Operation, following it, the unsatisfied customs duty reductions due to 
the Protocol, and the military act in 12 September 1980, were the most visible ones. On 
the other hand, Turkey achieved a considerable economic performance after the 1980s.
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
VII. 1. Demographics
Since the customs union is not only an economic phenomena, but also another means to 
the integration, the analysis has to deal with other measures, as well. Demographics are of 
the major decision criteria, because they play the key roles, especially when an 
integration is considered.
When the accession of Spain and Portugal has been realized, although Portugal has not 
accompanied significant growth terms with it, the contribution of Spain has increased 
both the area and the population by a considerable amount (Table 1). The area was 
enlarged by 30.4% while the respective value for population was 12%. In addition, the 
enlargement played a positive role in the rejuvenation of the Community average due to 











below  15 15-64 above 64
EC (Ten) 1656.4 322796 0.3 19.9 66.2 13.9
Spain 504.8 38688 0.7 24.4 63.9 11.7
Portugal 92.1 10230 0.6 25.6 63.0 11.4
1993
T Lirkey 774.8 58960 2.2 37.5 58.1 4.4
EC (Twelve) 2252.1 345000 0.4
Source: T urkey State Institute of Statistics, Provincial i 
1985-1990.
mcl Regional Statistics, and OECD Country Studies,
In case, Turkey becomes a part of the union, its contribution to population and land will 
be mueli higher than that of Spain's or Portugal's (34.6% increase in area and 17% 
increase in area).^  ^ When considered the population growth rates, the impact seems to 
accumulate through years, which does not sound to be an advantage. Since the rate for 
Turkey is remarkably higher than the EC average, this is expected to bring unemployment 
problem with it. The free circulation of Turkish workers has, therefore, continuously been 
avoided by the member states, such as France and Germany.
VII.2. Unemployment
When the second enlargement act was initiated, due to the Community's need to 
additional and low-cost labor force, the unemployment rates in Portugal and Spain have 
not appeared as important criteria for the decision making. Portugal, as a result of its huge 
number of workers residing abroad, seemed not to have a visible touch on the EC 
average, but Spain, with its high unemployment rate, became a matter of debate. Spain's 
integration into the EC has pulled the unemployment rate from 7.6% up to 8.2% (Eurostat 
1987). On the other hand, today, the issue is rather concerning. The unemployment rates
^^Ciilciilalcd using the data in Table 2.
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foi' Spain and Ireland are 19.3% each (OECD Economic Outlook, 1993). The Community 
average, being announced by the EC News as 9.9% for 1993, has been estimated to reach 
to 12% by the end of 1994. The contribution of Turkey to this value will, unfortunately, 
be severer, pulling it up to 13%. Turkey's negative impact on the EC unemployment level 
has been forecasted to be much higher than Spain's, which became a real problem for the 
Community.
VII.3. Composition by Sectors
The segmentation of active population is another deterministic measure to facilitate the 
adjustment processes. When the employment structures for Spain and Portugal have been 
analyzed with respect to their compositions, both countries have proved to give less 
importance to the agriculture and rather concentrate on Industry and Services (Table 2).
Table 2




Spain 18.0 32.7 49.3
Portugal 23.8 34.0 42.2
As stated in the previous parts of the study, the Community was already suffering from 
the agricultural suipluses, which further accumulated by the enlargement decision. 
Turkey, which acted as an agricultural country in the mid 1980s, seems to transform into 
a service-oriented one by the 1990s (Table 3).
Table 3
Composition by Sectors in Turkey in per centages (1990-1993)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Agriculture 18.9 16.2 15.4 4.2
Industiy 22.7 23.1 22.8 26.1
Services 58.4 60.7 61.8 69.7
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The diminishing share of the agi-iculture has been explained by the State Institute of 
Statistics as the agriculture's losing importance and the urbanization. However, the share 
of the active population employed in the agricultural sectors over 40%, while the industry 
has only accommodated 18% of this labor force. Whatever the case is, the emphasis 
should be given to the sectors, either industrial or services, where Turkey has competitive 
power and comparative superiorities.
VII.4. GDP per Capita
As for the GDP per capita, in 1986, the figures for EC (12), Spain, and Porhigal were 
$10,732, $5,945. and $2,984 respectively. The concerning issue was the integration of 
Portugal, which has had a GDP well beyond the EC average (almost one third). In 1993, 
while the GNP per capita for Turkey has still flown around $2,600, the large differential 
in between proves to be a disadvantage from the point of view of indicating the low level 
of the welfare.
VII. 5. Growth Rates
Despite the GNP gap, Turkey has had a higher growth rate than Spain and Poitugal for 
the last 20 years, ignoring exceptions (Table 4). If the general ti’end continues, the 
cumulative effect of growth rates will help to overcome above gap, in case a stable 
economic environment has been satisfied. Having a rate of growth of 4.5% in 1993, 
Turkey, also, experiences an increase in its exports.
Table 4
International Comparison of Recent Economic Growth Rates





EC Average 2.2 2.4
Calculated by using the data obtained from Direction of Trade Statistics, 
Studies-Turkey, 1990.
1993, and OBCD Economic
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VII.6. Inflation Rates
The most fragile point in the decision making criteria appears to be the consumer and 
producer price indices. Turkey is extremely unsuccessful when compared the country's 
inflation rate with that of the Community average. Since the EC is still conscious about 
the high (relative to EC average) inflation rates of its last three members, the drastic 
picture of Turkey does not attract and facilitate the integration. In 1985, the Consumer 
Price Indices (CPI) for Spain, Portugal, and Turkey were 8.8, 11.7, and 34.6 per centages 
respectively (OECD Economic Outlook, 1988). Even then, Turkey has not seemed to be a 
perfect candidate to the Community. The countiy, in 1993, has a CPI of 69.2% (SIS 
Monthly Review, Dec.93). Considering that the Community average for inflation rate is 
3.5% (Eurostat, 1993), Turkey's high CPI emerges as a negative pressure on the relations 
with the EC.
VII.7. Balance of Payment Accounts
Within the 1985-1987 period, although the foreign trade balances of Spain and Portugal 
have fluctuated (Table 5), almost doubling from 1986 to 1987, the large foreign trade 
deficit have not pulled the current account down to deficits. The increase in current 
account in year 1986 was explained by the positive impact of Spain's membership to the 
Community (Ozkale, 1990) . In addition, the decrease in the following year, in the 
balance of foreign trade and balance of current account was supported by the considerable 
increase in the balance of capital movements, which indicated the results of the 







1990 1991 1992 1993
(million $) 
Foreign Trade -6438 -5814 -12783 -1627 -1715 -3662 -9554 -7326 -8191 -3792
Balanee




-1908 -1842 11325 688 -1428 1394 -2397 3648 2961 3966
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As for Portugal, the fluctuations have almost followed the same pattern. The decrease in 
the balance of foreign trade was accompanied by the decrease in the current account 
balance. But, when considered the capital account, as it was for Spain, the item has 
signaled a surplus of $1394 million in 1987. The relative figures for Turkey verifies that 
the countiy has not overcome its problems yet. The increasing deficit in the current 
account doubled with the negative foreign trade balance has left the counti-y more 
vulnerable to the negative impacts of the customs union, than Spain and Portugal of 
1986.
I’lirkey has, almost e\ cry period, suffered from the foreign balance of payments problem. 
This appeared as a disadvantage to its final goal, being an EC member state.
V11.7. Comparative Foreign Trade
As for the comparative analysis of the foreign trade, total export and import volumes of 
the analyzed countries for the 1985-1987 period have been given in Table 6. Ranking the 
first with its exports for the stated duration, Spain has also experienced a considerable 
increase in its imports account. Nevertheless, the tourism and worker revenues led to a 
surplus in the current account balance in 1987.
Table 6
Total Exports Total Imports
1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987
(million $)
Spain 24247 27206 34192 29963 35057 49113
Portugal 5685.17242 9320.4 7652.4 9650 13966.6
Turkey 7958 7999 10164 fl035 11027 13269
Source: Direction ofTradc Statistics Yearbook, 1991.
Since the extremely different land sizes of Portugal and Turkey make it unmeaningful to 
compare the trade volumes, a comparison of exports to imports ratios will be more sound 
(Table 7). Both Spain and Portugal faced a decrease in their export to import ratio in 
1987. This can be explained by the elimination of import barriers and, in turn, increase in 
imports and domestic consumption.
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Table 7
Total Exports / Total Imports
1985 1986 1987
Spain 80.9 77.6 69.6
Portugal 74.3 75.0 68.3
Turkey 72.1 72.5 74.6
Source: Calculated using Table 6
On the other hand, a more significant indicator of the trade relations is the exports and 
imports to and from the Community (Table 8). Although the exports to imports ratios in 
Table 7 seemed to be reduced, the trade with the EC has better developed.
Table 8
Exports to EC Imports from EC
1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987
(million $) 
Spain 12645 16417 21823 11041 17665 26815
share to total(%) 52.2 60.3 63.8 36.8 50.4 54.6
Portugal 3563 4944 6693 3510.7 5692 9289.7
share lo total(%) 62.7 68.3 71.8 45.8 58.9 66.5
Source: Calculated using the data from Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1991.
Both imports and exports have run up. However, this time the export to import ratios 
(Table 9) have proved to follow a descending path. Turkey has increased its exports to the 













iiie foreign trade account of the country with the EC has developed within the recent 
years. Although the EC share in exports of Turkey has decreased following 1980s, this 
was explained by the Iran-Iraq war, which led to an increase in the country's exports to 
this region.
VII.8. Turkey-EC Trade Relations
Turkey's main trading partner is the EC. Turkey-EC relations are not only important for 
the membership discussions. Except for the cut back that has occurred after the 1980 
militai'y move, EC ranked first among the foreign trade of Turkey (Table 10).
Table 10




1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
27.7 27.0 31.7 41.0 43.9 41.1 38.5 44.3 43.8 46.7
Total
Exports 35.1 38.3 39.4 40.8 47.9 43.7 46.7 55.7 51.8 52.6
Calculations arc on the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks, Export and Import Data.
Turkey's exports to the Community increased at %18.5 per annum from 1979 to 1985, 
and at %14.6 from 1985 to 1989. On the other hand, the imports showed an increasing
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trend with the percentages of 10.4 and 14.7 for each period. This proves that the trade 
balance has not changed on behalf of rurkcy. This may be considered as a result of the 
increase in imports as well as the non-dcsircd trade limits.
The accession of Spain and Portugal to tlic BC did not create a diversion effect on the 
Turkish trade (Ozkale, 1990). Because llie ncrease in these countries' exports to EC 
remained well below the numbers for rurkey Thus, the decrease in exports in 1988 may 
be a result of decreasing demand, oi decreasing international prices of same products in 
the exports of evaluated counn ies. As for the 1990s, the EC has proved to be a veiy 
significant market for I'urkey, since it has constituted more than 50% of the country's 
exports and 40”o of the imports. However, from the EC perspective, Turkey has not 
carried such importance. Tlie shares of Tuikcy's exports and imports in the EC trade are 
0.563% and 0.00731% respectively in year 1992.^ '^
VII. 9. Competitive Structure
Ozkale (1990) observed that, for the 1983-1988 period, Turkey has not seemed to be a 
compelitor to these countries in the exports of all goods. For the exports of agricultural 
products, the highest similarity was calculated between Spain and Turkey, which signed 
their competing with each other. However, tli3 share of agriculture in the exports of both 
of them was decreasing, leaving the competition insignificant. On the other hand, 
Portugal stalled to become an important competitor of Turkey in industrial goods sector.
VIII. THE CASE FOR TURKEY
As a result of the protectionist policies wheh promoted import substitution and rent 
economies, and the globalization trend, the Turkish economy needed to achieve a 
development towards export increases, and ac; in free market environment.
Undergoing a decade of rapid growth, Turkey had an annual GDP growth rate of 4.3% for 
1971-1980 and 5.5% for 1981-1990 time periods. It has faced remarkable changes by 
initializing the implementation of liberal economic policies in the early 1980s. These 
were to minimize intervention of Governmen: in economic life, and to enforce necessary 
measures for the effective operation of a free market economy.
^^ ’Calculalcd using Dircclion ori'iiKle Slaiislics Yearbook l‘*93, lixport and Import Data.
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Some of those measures were export promotion and liberal import regimes. Export 
Promotion included a rise in the extent of foreign currency retention, as well as abolition 
of duties on imported materials used to manufacture exported products. Liberal Import 
Regimes consisted of removal of all taxes and duties on a very large list of imports to 
prepare Turkish industry to meet the challenges of international competition. This would 
be achieved via liberalization of the exchange control system, and the elimination of 
quota system.
Turkey made large investments on its infrastructure in motor ways, telecommunications, 
energy, other transportation networks and tourism. Meanwhile, the country developed its 
(inancial system, and established the institutional framework to develop the capital 
market. It presented new financial instruments along with liberal trade policies to 
promote exports and to remove barriers on imports.
VIII. 1. Value Added Tax (VAT)
d’he similarity in the tax stmctures, by the alignment to VAT system, has appeared to be 
an alieady completed adjustment cycle. Turkey has showed conformity with the EC 
norms and directives in this regard.
VIII.2. Privatization Program
Starting from the mid 1980s, the Government has implemented the privatization program. 
The underlying purposes of this act were to minimize the involvement of the State in the 
economy, to accelerate and fecilitate the establislmient of market mechanisms within the 
context of liberal economic policies. In addition, the role of the Government in the 
economy would be confined to areas such as health, education, national security, and 
large scale infrastructural investments. It would be possible to provide the suitable legal 
and structural environment for free enterprises to operate.
Major targets of privatization were:
• to enliance competition in the economy,
• to decrease the financing burden of the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) on the 
national budget,
• to broaden and deepen the existing eapital market by promoting wider share of 
ownership, and
• to provide efficient allocation of resources.
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Public Participation High Council (PPHC) appears as the decision making and the 
executive body of the program, while Public Participation Administration (PPA) is 
responsible for the planning and exeeution.
In order to. attract and encourage the foreign investors to invest in Turkey, the Turkish 
Government provides incentives and grants, which are grouped in two categories, namely 
investment and export incentives. As an example to investment incentives; it is possible 
to benefit from exemption from custom duties and taxes on imported machinery and 
equipment, and from low interest loans.
Major privatization methods used in I'lirkey include block sale, public offering, and a 
combination of block sale and public offering.
When the foreign direct investment structure for Turkey is analyzed, it is observed that 
over 2000 companies (as many as in Denmark) from more than 75 countries invested in 
Turkey. During 1985-1990 FDI permissions have increased by 71%.
On the other hand, while Spain had pulled the share of public companies down to 10 to 
15 % points by the adjustment act, this value is still at 40-45% for Turkey.
VIII.3. Technical Preparation to the Customs Union
The EC had in EC News (No:22), on December 1993, stated that in order to prepare the 
Turkish customs officers to the customs union to be realized, an education program 
would be given starting from Oetober 1993, and thus be supported by the Community 
(costing ECU 630.000). A donation of ECU 230.000 would be spent for the feasibility 
analysis of the installation of computer systems for the customs services. Besides, the 
administrative workshop between the EC and the Turkish Governmental Institutions 
would be accompanied by ECU 200.00. Since one of the major problems has been the 
patent rights, expertizing edueation would be supplied to form the staff for Turkish Patent 
Bureau. However, due to the Community budget problems and some political conflicts 
(stemming from the 'human rights in Turkey' issue), the technical preparation project has 
been postponed to a later date.
^^For the period 1986-1992, block sale privatization applications constituted 31.86% of the total sales, and 




The share of . the labor force in the total population that is actively involved in the 
production constitutes a larger value for the industrialized countries. For Turkey, this 
ratio has been calculated to be 38.5% in 1991, although it was 43.3% in 1968 (ILO, 1991 
Yearbook of Labor Statistics). On the other hand, the figures do not differ considerably 
from those of the EC member states. In addition, the ILO Statistics show that, in Turkey, 
the employer, employee and wageless family employee shares have as 26.22, 36.75, and 
3 1.54 per centages respectively (1991). The great share of the latter indicates a structural 
problem, since it has been a sign of hidden unemployed segment (especially in 
agi icultural sector). Therefore, the hidden economy results with a higher pressure (such 
as income tax) on the salaried workers.
Labor Costs
Spain and Portugal have been in an advantageous position with respect to the labor costs, 
when the accession was realized. The low labor costs allowed these countries be more 
attractive to the foreign direct investments. However, in 1993, the labor costs in Turkey 
became almost the same with the member states, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. The 
numerical efficiency is well beyond. Due to the '91 Agreement with the workers, the cost 
of a worker (e.g. metal worker) became $12,000, 4 times of the GNP per capita.^ *^  This is 
a conflict for the macroeconomic decision making mechanisms.
The regulation and organization of the employment terms have already been defined in 
the Treaty of Rome. The deals have been identified by the Soeial Aet Program, Single 
European Aet, and the Community Soeial Rights Requirement, and have included issues 
such as employment, education, law, social security, union rights, woman workers, young 
unemployed, retirement policy, free circulation, and the employment of the handicapped. 
Since Turkey has not solved some of the problems concerning the above items, the 
country should adopt a labor market adjustment process. Besides, the recent privatization 
moves and lay-offs led to an increase in the unemployed population. In order to avoid a 
social boost, a compensation program should be adopted, as it was the Industrial 
Reconversion Program in Spain.
-^^Avnipa Birliği ve Gümrük Birliği, MESS Publication, No:l97, April 1994,
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VII!.5. SECTORAL EVALUATION 
Vril.5.1.AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Tuikey has pioved to achieve self-suiticiency in agricultural sector due to its geographies 
and climate. In addition, the Government actively intervenes in the sector by support 
lunds and protectionist policies. In order to set a basis tor the national accounting 
piocediires, the agriculture sector in lurkcy has been defined as the combination of three 
sub-sectors, which can be stated as follows;
I. Farming (including Plant Production, Animal Production, and Agricultural Craft)
II. Forestry
III. Fisheries and (Land) Hunting
In the pre-Second World War era, the activities, regulations, and procedures in this sector 
were l)ased on several institutional forms. Following 1940s, the technological point of 
view became more significant, and the approaehes developed were in the way to change 
the production function rather than modifying the related legal structure. Chased by the 
technieal developments (i.e. chemical, biological), the modernization period has been 
activated.
Currently, on one hand, the seetor involves a technologically developed (and developing) 
which produces for the market and is sensitive to price movements. However, on the 
other hand, there still continues the activities of a poorer segment, which follows 
traditional production methods on smtill areas, that do not allow for benefiting from 
eeonomies of scale.
Aruoba (1992) states that the major bottlenecks were due to animal breeding, especially 
red meat and milk production, and marketing restrictions. Rather than imposing on plant 
production, the idea of giving emphasis to animal production and implementing relevant 
policies was supported and launched by the Turkish Milk, Meat, Food Producers Union 
(SETBIR).
As for the customs union, Turkey has already followed the transitory measures 
determined in the Additional Protocol and CAP. Thus, the next step should be to improve 
the product quality and standards in order to penetrate and compete ia the EC market. The 
Community has faced a considerable agricultural surplus problem by the integration of 
Spain and Portugal (Appendix 11). The common products, olive oil, fruit and vegetables.
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and wine appeared to be threatening as a result of the overproduction which costed 1.645 
million ECU to the EC. In addition, within the 1980-90 period, Turkey's share of 
agricultural products in the counti-y's total exports to EC has dropped from 51.1% to 
15.2%.39 This differential has been explained by the sector's losing importance.
The issue is the enlargement of EC towards south. The southern countries of Europe are 
believed to be similar to Turkey, because of similar products, technologies, culture, and 
sociological structure. The enlargement has not threatened the exports of Turkish 
conventional agricultural products. However, all the other export products may be 
effected by the Spanish products benefiting from customs tax exempts. Even though 
furkey exports its agricultural products to EC without custom, Spain will be saved by 
non-tariff barriers.
By the initiation of the customs union, Turkey will be strictly subordinated to the CAP 
regulations. Since the gradual tariff reductions were already realized, it is of a low 
probability to encounter further economic problems. However, the CAP prevents the 
price competition. As an alternative, Turkey can increase its agricultural exports towards 
the third countries. Being a previous example, Greece has lost its competitiveness in this 
sector by the implementation of CAP.^° Spain and Portugal differed from Greece, because 
they did not get use of common membership status.
VIII.5.2. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
As it was for Portugal and Spain, the most concerning problems to be posed have been 
due to the sectors with structural overcapacity, such as textiles. Having followed import 
substitution and rent economies for a long time period, the sector experienced an adoption 
problem to the newly emerging industrial policies. In order to facilitate the adoption 
process, several strategical policies have been designated. These have targeted:
I. to force the firms in the industry to adopt
by lowering the domestic demand, 
by increasing competition, or 
by increasing the resource cost; and
II. to ease the adoption process for the firms
by making foreign markets attractive.
-'’‘hiDTM Statistics, 1992. 
4«SaiTis, 1984.
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by increasing abroad competition power,
. by overcoming input bottlenecks, or 
by reducing partial resource costs.
As a result of the implementations, the capacity utilization has increased from 50% in 
1980s to 74% in 1990 and the private sector has pioneered the industrial investment, but 
the share of the industrial investment in total investments has decreased (SIS Annual, 
1992). The latter was related to the utilization of overcapacity in some sectors, capacity 
expansion of some of the already existing factories, and the use of better quality, import 
raw materials as inputs to production.
While the share of industrial goods in Turkish exports has jumped from 41.4% in 1980 to 
82.7% in 1990, the respective share in the country's imports has only decreased by 2 
points (from 98.7% in 1980 to 96.2% in 1990)."^ ' The ever-lasting trade deficits and the 
above shares represent the importance of the relations with the Community.
From the competitive power aspect, the low unit labor costs in Spain and Portugal gave 
these countries a superiority. For Turkey, however, the Common Tariffs making the 
customs tax fall has been forecasted to lead (and is leading) the automotive seetor be 
worse off, and unemployment in turn.
As for the textile industiy, the Community has faced a stagflation following the First Oil 
Crisis. The decrease in the intra-Community trade led to the applications of non-tariff 
barriers among member states, under the excuse of unsatisfied standards or norms. Thus, 
starting with the UK's self-determined quantity restraints on Turkish thread exports in 
1975, the Community deelared to put quotas on several ready wear produets. What is to 
be done for the textile sector, which currently sounds to be the most promising, is to 
identify the filling ratios for the quotas. For the ratios over 90%, if the export capacity 
allows, new marketing policies should be adopted either to third world eountries or to the 
Eastern Europe. For the ratios below 50%, better quality standards and sales procedures 
should be satisfied to get use of the quota content.
In 1990s, although the EC has represented a veiy significant market for the Turkish 
exports and imports (50% and 42% respectively), the share of Turkey in the Community
^blDTM Statistic.s, 1990.
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imports and exports does not prove to be sound. Besides, the 58% of the EC imports have 
been due to the intra-Community trade (Eurostat 1990).
From the point of view of industrial production, since the raw materials are of the highest 
importance in competitive production and Turkey has no advantage in them, the raw 
material suppliers will all be put out of operation. In addition, the counti-y has 
disadvantages stemming from transportation difficulties. As some probable results of this 
union, in Turkey, the automotive companies, such as Fiat and Renault, may turn to their 
origins. However, the side sectors (especially raw material suppliers) will disappear.
I'urkish industrial goods are imported by the Community with tax exemptions. The only 
exception is the ceiling on petroleum products. In addition, there applied quotas on textile 
exports. Therefore, in the industrial goods sector, except for textile and petroleum 
products, the real problem is the lack of competitiveness.
VIII.5.3. ENERGY PLANNING
Turkey ranks the first in energy costs within the Community. The import dependency on 
energy has been forecasted to increase for the following 20 years by the Ministiy of 
Energy and Natural Resources. Besides, the energy consumption patterns seemed to 
follow an emerging trend towards industrial sector, rather than housing (Anioba, 1992). 
The increasing use of geothennal energy and the natural gas, and the need for secondary 
energy resources has been anticipated to lead to the aetivation of recycling plants. As it 
was for the EC member states and other developed countries of the world, unless the 
energy consumption measures are defined within the Govermiient policies, it won't be 
possible to overcome the increasing deficit and import dependency.
VIII.5.4. BANKING SERVICES
The Turkish banking system has faced significant legal and structural modifications 
following the free market economies that have been activated starting from 1980s. Banks 
have been allowed to implement positive real interest rates. The environment has been 
made suitable and attractive for the foreign bankers to operate and serve. As in case of 
Portugal and Spain, several innovative approaches have been initiated and modernization 
of banking activities have been hurried. It has been allowed to establish new trade banks. 
In addition, the Turkish bankers have started to function abroad.
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Together with the above basic changes, some institutional reforms have accelerated the 
renewal of banking system. By the new banking directive, thé permissions to open branch 
offices were loosened. Regulations have been designated not to permit the vote rights to 
accumulate in the hands of big shareholders (partners). Special auditing processes have 
been implemented for monitoring the banks, and the banking system has been enlarged to 
involve specific finance institutions as well. Since Turkish banking services have been 
active players in the European market, the atmosphere for the services sector seems to be 
more promising than energy, industry, or agriculture.
IX. CONCLUSION
Unless the macroeconomic stabilization and the related balances are achieved, Turkey 
will be carrying a heavy burden by getting into a customs union with the EC. It can be 
misleading to enter a customs union by making one sector better off, while another worse. 
A country-wide approach is needed in order to maximize the benefits and minimize 
losses. The last entrants of the Community are trying to save themselves from the 
possible damages to be posed by the Turkish exports. Greece continuously rejects the 
Financial Protocol, Portugal reacts to Turkish textile exports, and Spain is conscientious 
on industrial goods.
25 years ago, Spain was almost of the same tableau with Turkey from GNP and GNP per 
capita aspects. However, today it has a significant economic power. For Greece, although 
it is impossible for the country to have a value added more than Turkey, its GNP is much 
higher due to its benefiting from Community funds.
As already indicated, there emerges some deficiencies in the development process of 
customs union from the point of view of Turkey. First, Turkey is not a part of the 
Community decision making mechanism, but only consultation. Second, it does not get 
use of the free circulation right of production factors. And finally, Turkey will not be able 
to benefit from EC structural funds, which played an important role in the adjustment 
processes of Spain and Portugal.
Given the comparative analysis and evaluation, the probable negative impacts of customs 
union on Turkey can be stated as follows:
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• The industrial sector, which is the only one to accommodate the increasing 
unemployed resulting from population growth and high population in agriculture, 
may be in a position that does not allow the sector save, even, the current workers.
• If some sensitive sectors are made open to competition before a short transition 
period, they can no longer be active.
• Turkey's need to finance (possible) increasing imports may end up with the re­
activation of protectionist applications.
• Unless the elimination of customs revenues is compensated by the Community, the 
public deficit may reach to peak points.
It is estimated that Turkey would face a loss of $3-6 billion in the first instance (Mess 
Publish, 1994), due to the tax exempts, but it has still committed itself to the customs 
union. On the other hand, the Community has failed on two issues, namely free 
circulation of workers and financial cooperation, which are significant facilitators of the 
adjustment process. As an example, the 600 million ECU to be paid in 1986 has not been 
supplied to Turkey till now. Besides, this amount, in the form of an adjustment period 
aid, would be increased at every 5 years time.
In his recent announcement, Jacques Delors, the Community Head, states that EC would 
enlarge towards south even including Malta and South Cyprus, but not Turkey. As well 
as the economic factors, the Community seems to display a reactive behavior to religious 
and cultural factors.
In order to provide macroeconomic stability and to reduce inflation rate to reasonable 
levels, the policy makers (politicians in this case) need to identify their objectives clearly 
and make long-temi plans. This will be possible through balancing the budget deficit. 
Turkey should improve and increase the number of the sectors where it has comparative 
superiorities. On the other hand the imbalances in the economic environment do not 




Example Cases for the Privatization of Publicly Owned Companies in Spain 
Source: IMF Occasional Paper 
No:101
The Spanish privatization act was started with the sales of approximately thirty countries, 
and partial privatization by sales of minority holdings on the stock exchange. The latter 
included General Eléctrica Sociedad Anónima (GESA), Empresa Nacional de Celulosas y 
Papel ÍENCE), Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Sociedad Anónima (ENDESA), and 
REPSOL, the state enterprise in charge of oil production and distribution.
In the industrial sector, the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) was split in two parts: the 
Teneo Group or INISA receiving all the profitable or potentially profitable firms, and the 
Sociedad Estatal del Instituto Nacional de Industria (INISE), the remaining films. INISA 
was expected to invest in private sector companies, and in the long run, to open up its 
own capital to private investors. By contrast, INISE would remain a public enterprise 
including the firms operating in steel industry, mining, weaponry, and shipbuilding, and 
these firms would require subsidies from the Government.
APPENDIX I
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EC MEMO , BRUSSELS, 20 DECEMBER 1985
THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ACCESSION AGREEMENTS
1. INSTITUTIONS
From 1 January 1986, Council will have twelve members. Spain's eight votes and 
Portugal's five will bring the total number of votes to 76, with 54 being required for a 
qualified majority (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom: 10 votes; Belgium, 
Greece, and the Netherlands: 5 votes; Denmark and Ireland: 3 votes; Luxembourg: 2 
votes).
The two Spanish members and one Portuguese member of the Commission will bring the 
total number of Commissioners to 17. The European Parliament will have 518 members 
with the addition of 60 Spanish and 24 Portuguese members, designated by their national 
pari iaments in the first instance and then by direct universal suffrage before 31 December 
1987.
The number of the judges at the Court of Justice will rise from 11 to 13, Portugal and 
Spain each sending one. There will be six Advocates-General, Portugal and Spain taking 
it in turns to designate the sixth.
Membership of the Economic and social Committee will increase by 21 members for 
Spain and 12 for Portugal, making 189 in total. The Court of Auditors will also be 
expanded, with each new Member State sending one member.
Adjustment will also be made to the ECSC Consultative Committee, the Scientific and 
Technical committee of Euratom, the Advisory Committee and the capital of the Euratom 
Supply Agency and the administration of the European Investment Bank.
2. CUSTOMS UNION
Spain:
progressive abolition of customs duties over a seven-year transitional period; 
abolition of quantitative restrictions on the date of accession;
APPENDIX II
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alignment of the Spanish customs tariff on the Common Customs Tariff over a period of 
seven years;
application of competition rules and introduction of VAT on the date of accession; 
special provisions for motor vehicles, textiles, the steel indushy, and national policies.
Portugal:
progressive abolition of intra-Community customs duties over seven-year transitional 
period and, simultaneously;
alignment of the Portuguese tariff on that of the Community; 
a two-stage abolition of quantitative restrictions and other measures; 
postponement of full introduction of VAT until the fourth year after accession; 
special provisions for motor vehicles, textiles and national monopolies.
3. AGRICULTURE
progressive application of the machinery of the common organizations of the markets and 
establisliment of the free circulation of goods after transitional periods varying according 
to the products;
application of general or "classic" arrangements to most agricultural products over a 
seven-year period with a progressive alignment of prices and aids, accession 
compensatory amounts, the gradual implementation of customs union and Spain's 
progressive application of the Community's preferential arrangements;
special arrangements for wine, vegetable oils, and fresh fruit and vegetables, and a 
surveillance system for imports of sensitive products (fruit and vegetables, milk, butter, 
cheese, beei7veal, common wheat, milk powder, potatoes and wine).
Portugal:
same general principles as for Spain with "classic" transitional arrangements which will 
apply to processed fruit and vegetables, sugar and iso-glucose, and vegetable oils, in 
general over a seven-year transitional period (10 years for vegetable oils), with the 
Community bringing forward tariff dismantlement by one year, and indeed four in the 
case of tomatoes;
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specific transitional arrangements for 85% of Portuguese production (cereals, rice, milk 
and milk products, beei7veal, pig-meat, eggs and poultry, fresh fruit and vegetables, and 
wine);
a surveillance system for imports, a specific development program and production inles 
for tomato concentrates, canned tomatoes, sunflowers, colza and rapeseed;




reciprocal access to maritime zones and respective stocks with monitoring arrangements;
on accession, application of the common fisheries policy subject to certain conditions;
progressive dismantling of intra-Community customs tariffs and alignment on the 
common external tariff over a seven-year transitional period, except for special 
circumstances, with special provisions for access to the zone lying between 6 and 12 
nautical miles for the exclusive economic zones and for certain sensitive species;
pre-accession aid of 28.5 million ECU.
Portugal:
no access for vessels of the present Member States to the 12 nautical mile coastal zone off 
Portugal and vice versa;
varying restrictions in the exclusive economic zone beyond the 12 mile line, to be 
reviewed by 31 December 1995;
application of the common fisheries policy subject to certain reservations;
customs dismantling over seven years for Portugal and six years for the Community, with
some special arrangements;
some provisions as for Spain concerning relations with non-member countries; 
special provisions for sardines and structural matters.
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5. SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
Spain:
application of social legislation, including that concerning the Social Fund, on accession; 
seven-year transitional period during which certain restrictive national measures may be 
retained;
five years after accession, review of the transitional arrangements for free circulation of 
workers; special provisions for equal treatment, access to employment and social 
insurance benefits.
Portugal; same provisions as Spain.
6. BUDGETARY PROVISIONS
Spain:
full participation in the financing of the budget and in expenditure, subject to certain 
transitional measures, Spain will qualify for the various structural funds on accession; 
special provisions for the repayment of the VAT contribution, the amount repaid being 
set according to a sliding scale until 1992.
Portugal:
full participation in the financing of the budget and in expenditure, subject to certain 
transitional measures;
postponement of the full introduction of VAT until the fourth year after accession; 
special provisions on the graduated refund of VAT contributions based on GNP 
applicable for six years;
aid to the balance of payments in the form of a 1 million ECU loan over six years.
EFFECTS OF ACCESSION
1. AGRICULTURE
Spain's accession will increase Community's agricultural land area by 30%, the farm 
labor force by 25% and the number of holdings by 32%, while the number of consumers 
will grow by 14%. Portugal's accession will increase the area by only 4%, the agricultural 
labor force by 12.8% and the number of consumers by 3.6%.
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As for agricultural production, Spain's entry will increase vegetable production by 25%, 
that of fresh fruit by 48% and that of olive oil by 59%. Full cream milk output will rise by 
only 6% and that of cereals by 14.5%. Livestock numbers will rise by only 6%.
Overall, the Community will increase its degree of self-sufficiency in Mediterranean 
products (wine, fruit and vegetables, olive oil), with surpluses arising for some products, 
while the level will fall in the case of some livestock and cereal products.
The greatest problems will occur in olive oil, fruit and vegetables, and wine.
it is estimated that the Community of Twelve will have a surplus of 230.000 tones of 
olive oil, making it 122% self-sufficient, not only because of increased production 
following Spain's entry (increasing the self-sufficiency level by approximately 109%) but 
also because of the fact that the consumers are substituting cheaper vegetable oils for 
olive oil. The cost of the Community of Twelve's overproduction is estimated at 1.645 
million ECU against 845 million ECU for the Community of Ten.
Portugal's entry will not have any great impact on the self-sufficiency levels for citrus 
fruit and other fresh fniit and vegetables. But Spain's entry is another matter: Spain 
produces a large surplus of citrus fruit (235%) and, to a lesser extent, other fruit and 
vegetables (percentages vaiying between 100% and 120%).
Spain has 2.8 million hectares of irrigated land, increasing the area of irrigated land in the 
Mediterranean regions of the Community by 80%.
With twelve members, the Community's degree of self-sufficiency in citrus fruit will 
increase considerably, reaching 89%. The Community will become fully self-sufficient or 
more in the case of other fresh fmit and vegetables.
In the wine sector, Portugal has a surplus (122%), but the country represents only 5% of 
Community production. In Spain, 1.7 million hectares are planted to vines and Spanish 
production is 24% of the Community figure. Broadly speaking, the Community of 




As regards to fisheries, the main problem posed by Spain's accession is that of access to 
the Community's resources and restructuring measures in the sector.
Spain is a major producer and consumer of fishery products. A quarter of all fishermen in 
the Community of Twelve will be Spanish, and Spanish catches will account for a third 
of catches by value and a quarter by quantity. The tonnage of the Spanish fleet is 
equivalent to 70% of the tonnage of nine Comiminity Member States (excluding Greece). 
Despite this, Spain has an overall deficit in the fishery products.
In view of the fact that the Community is undergoing the same difficulties as Spain 
regarding fishing capacity in relation to the fishing grounds available, Spanish accession 
will aggravate the problem and entail major and costly restructuring measures.
Further difficulties are expected because the Community will represent Spain 
internationally. Spain has concluded many fisheries agreement with non-Community 
countries on the basis of financial compensation in order to compensate for the loss of 
natural resources and these agreements provide a great deal of work for part of the 
Spanish fleet.
3. INDUSTRY
The 1970 preferential agreement between Spain and the Community and the 1972 
agreement with Portugal offered these two countries substantial tariff concessions on an 
already low common external tariff. In general, the main impact of accession has already 
been felt in the Community of Ten. The opposite is tnie for the acceding countries. Spain, 
in particular, has to dismantle extremely protectionist customs duties and its tax and aids 
system has to be adapted to Community rules. In this respect, the introduction of VAT by 
Spain on 1 January 1986 is a notable step forward. Portugal has to abolish customs duties 
on a long list of products and its non-tariff barriers. The productivity of Spanish industry 
stands at about 40% of that of the Community, and the gap is even wider in the case of 
Portugal. The drop in productive investment is also a major problem.
However, the most tricky problems are those of sectors with structural over capacity 
(steel, shipbuilding, textiles) and the promotion of growth sectors (electronics and 
information technology, chemicals, agrifood).
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4. EMPLOYMENT
The effect of the accession of Portugal and Spain will be to reduce the percentage of 
active population in the Community. In 1984, 44% of the population in the Community 
of Ten was in work or unemployed against only 35% in Spain but 45% in Portugal.
Spain's situation is particularly critical since a fifth of its active population (20.2%) is 
unemployed, making Spain the country with the most unemployed according to the 
spring 1984 figures, followed by Ireland (16.5%), the Netherlands (12.8%), Belgium 
(11.9%), and Italy (9.6%).
T he-2.6 million Spanish unemployed will thus be added to 12.7 million in the 
Community oi Ten, which together with those of Portugal brings joblessness in the 
Community of Twelve up to 10.4%.
5. THE BUDGET
In view of the present situation regarding the 1986 budget, it is difficult to specify the 
effects of enlargement. It should, however, be noted that the resources of the various 
structural funds (EAGGF, ERDF, ESF) will rise considerably; enlargement will mean an 
increase of some 2.500 million ECU in 1986.
However, additional resources may prove necessary to ensure that Spain, and in 
particular, Portugal, do not become "net contributors" to the Community budget on 
accession.
EC'O'Spain 
($ million) EC->Spain Spain->EC NET
Aid resulting from Funds (VAT, Customs Tax, etc.)
1986 1025 1109 (-)84
1987 1757 1373 384
1988 3824 2223 1601
1989 4683 2874 1809
1990 4943 3743 1200
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A P P E N D IX  III
CHANGES IN SPAIN'S COMMERCIAL PROTECTION SINCE EC MEMBERSHIP
industrial Products
JGradual tariff rate reduction process from the base rate (approximately 14 per cent) to 
zero in the case of other EC countries, and from the base rate to the (lower) Common 
External Tariff rate fapproximately 4-5 per cent).
! ri he timetable for the above reduction is as. follows;
March 1 1986 10.0 per cent reduction
January 1 1987 12.5 per cent reduction
January 1 1988 15.0 per cent reduction
January 1 1989 15.0 per cent reduction
Januaiy 1 1990 12.5 per cent reduction
January 1 1991 12.5 per cent reduction
Januaiy 1 1992 12.5 per cent reduction
January 1 1993 10.0 per cent reduction
Total 100 per cent reduction
Agricultural Products
I Products originating in an EC country have preference (relative to products originating 
in non-EC countries) in other EC countries.
J Common Agricultural Policy accepted as of 1986.
I Gradual tariff rate reduction for agricultural products to be completed by January 1, 
1993. The timetable for fruits, vegetables, and vegetable fats extends to January 1, 1996.
Source: IMF Publications, Occasional Paper No:I()l
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